Export limit exceeded: 410734 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Export limit exceeded: 410734 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (410734 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68106 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix division by zero with invalid uvd dimensions When width or height is less than 16, width_in_mb or height_in_mb becomes 0, leading to fs_in_mb being 0. This causes a division by zero when calculating num_dpb_buffer in H264 and H264 Perf decode paths. Add validation to reject frames with width < 16 or height < 16 before performing any calculations that depend on these values. V2: Format change - move up all vaiable definitions. V3: Use warn_once to avoid spam. (cherry picked from commit 3e41d26c70b0a459d041cc19482a226c4b7423cb) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68104 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: invoke pm_genpd_remove() before freeing genpd Call pm_genpd_remove() to unregister from global list prior to releasing acp_genpd memory, and clear the pointer after free. (cherry picked from commit cd8650d7a91ee8b768e202354672553faa5cc1f2) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68103 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: reject mapping a reserved doorbell to a new queue When creating an user-queue, the user space provides a doorbell BO handle and an offset within the bo to obtain a doorbell. However current implementation using xa_store_irq() to store a doorbell, which allows a later queue created with the same BO and offset parameters to overwrite an existing queue and doorbell mapping. This can cause problems like misrouting fence IRQ processing to a wrong queue, and mislead the cleanup process of one queue erasing the mapping of another queue. This commit fixes this issue by replacing xa_store_irq with xa_insert_irq, which rejects mapping a reserved doorbell to a newly created queue (cherry picked from commit 6244eae22966350db52faf9c1369d3b2ffc5de4e) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68100 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth) originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact. On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() -> set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1] with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[] is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g. 255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully controlled by an authenticated client. The sibling functions already gate this field: parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check. Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68098 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: bound DACL dedup walk to copied ACEs set_ntacl_dacl() can stop copying ACEs before consuming the full input DACL when size accounting overflows. When that happens, num_aces reflects only the ACEs that were actually copied into the output DACL, but set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() still receives nt_num_aces and uses it to walk the existing ACE array during dedup. That makes the dedup walk scan past the copied ACE array and inspect buffer tail that does not contain valid ACEs. Split the two meanings currently carried by the NT ACE count. Pass the number of copied NT ACEs to bound the dedup walk, and preserve the original "input DACL had NT ACEs" state separately for the Everyone/default ACL fallback. This keeps the dedup walk aligned with the ACEs that are actually present in the rebuilt DACL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68096 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: fix recursive locking deadlock in audit_dupe_exe() A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating executable-related rules. When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then, audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path, leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking deadlock: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by mv/5099: #0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13) at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0 #1: ffff888112a9c790 (&type->s_vfs_rename_key#3) at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0 #2: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1) at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 #3: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/5) at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0 #4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&fsnotify_mark_srcu) at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0 #5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex) at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0 stack backtrace: Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00 __lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360 down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230 __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40 audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0 audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0 audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00 audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0 audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0 send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0 fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0 fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630 vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0 do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0 __x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c </TASK> The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running the script below: audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh -------------------------- #!/bin/bash auditctl -D mkdir -p /tmp/foo touch /tmp/file auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file rm -Rf /tmp/foo This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the kern_path_parent() path resol ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-68091 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: stop hardware after post-start probe failures wacom_parse_and_register() starts HID hardware before registering inputs and initializing pad LEDs/remotes. Those later steps can fail, but their error paths currently release Wacom resources without stopping the HID hardware. Route post-hid_hw_start() failures through hid_hw_stop() before releasing driver resources. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68085 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_uart: clear HCI_UART_SENDING when write_work is canceled HCI_UART_SENDING bit in tx_state means write_work is pending and blocks queueing it again. Currently this bit is not cleared when canceling the work in hci_uart_close(), which blocks future writes when device is reopened later if write_work was pending. Fix by clearing HCI_UART_SENDING when canceling the work. Also make clearing of tx_skb safe by using disable_work_sync + enable_work instead of just cancel_work_sync. hci_uart_flush() purges the proto tx queue so we can cancel the pending write_work there, instead of doing it just in hci_uart_close(). Re-enable and possibly requeue the work after queue flush. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64600 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 8 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux, Enterprise Linux Eus and 5 more | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: resample the data fork mapping after cycling ILOCK xfs_reflink_fill_{cow_hole,delalloc} are both presented with an inode, a data fork mapping, and a cow fork mapping. Unfortunately, these two helpers cycle the ILOCK to grab a transaction, which means that the mappings are stale as soon as we reacquire the ILOCK. Currently we refresh the cow fork mapping by re-calling xfs_find_trim_cow_extent, but we don't refresh the data fork mapping beforehand, which means that the xfs_bmap_trim_cow in that function queries the refcount btree about the wrong physical blocks and returns an inaccurate value in *shared. If *shared is now false, the directio write proceeds with a stale data fork mapping. Fix this by querying the data fork mapping if the sequence counter changes across the ILOCK cycle. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64597 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_close() replay A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_close_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64582 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix a use-after-free problem in rxe_mmap rxe_mmap() removes a rxe_mmap_info struct from the pending_mmaps list and releases pending_lock while the struct's kref is still at 1: list_del_init(&ip->pending_mmaps); spin_unlock_bh(&rxe->pending_lock); /* ref == 1, no lock held */ ret = remap_vmalloc_range(vma, ip->obj, 0); /* walks PTEs */ [...] rxe_vma_open(vma); /* kref_get, ref → 2 */ remap_vmalloc_range_partial() walks PTEs without any lock. A concurrent DESTROY_CQ ioctl on another CPU calls: kref_put(&q->ip->ref, rxe_mmap_release) /* ref 1→0 */ vfree(ip->obj) /* clears vmalloc PTEs mid-walk */ kfree(ip) /* frees rxe_mmap_info */ This yields: 1. Kernel crash, vmalloc_to_page() returns NULL when vfree wins the per-PTE race -> vm_insert_page(NULL) → GPF in validate_page_before_insert 2. Page UAF, vmalloc_to_page() reads a stale PTE before vfree clears it. User VMA holds a PTE to a free'd page which might eventually get reallocated later by vmalloc which allows the attacker to get a clean page-level UAF. It is worth noting that even though a page-level UAF is possible given the strong primitive, it is statistically very difficult to achieve given the very short time window (after the last insert_page and before the kref_get). The call trace are as below: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 413 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc5-dirty #28 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:validate_page_before_insert+0x32/0x300 Code: e5 41 57 41 56 49 89 fe 41 55 41 54 53 48 89 f3 e8 93 b5 a3 ff 48 8d 7b 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 7b 02 00 00 4c 8b 63 08 31 ff 4d 89 e5 41 83 e5 RSP: 0018:ffff88811b15f2f0 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: ffff88811b15f318 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881181eee00 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881181eee00 R15: ffff8881181eee20 FS: 00007b1e000f76c0(0000) GS:ffff8884268e0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007b1e00a24ac0 CR3: 0000000116eb3000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> insert_page+0x8f/0x190 ? __pfx_insert_page+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x38/0x60 vm_insert_page+0x2e7/0x400 remap_vmalloc_range_partial+0x212/0x3e0 remap_vmalloc_range+0x6e/0xb0 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 rxe_mmap+0x2e9/0x5d0 ib_uverbs_mmap+0x1ad/0x2c0 __mmap_region+0x12c2/0x2ad0 ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xb0 ? mas_prev_slot+0x360/0x39c0 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xb0 ? mas_next_slot+0x1e5b/0x2f40 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8+0x18/0x30 ? unmapped_area_topdown+0x4dd/0x610 ? kfree+0x1b1/0x440 ? free_cpumask_var+0x16/0x30 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x7d/0xa0 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8+0x18/0x30 mmap_region+0x2e6/0x3c0 do_mmap+0xa3e/0x12a0 ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 ? down_write_killable+0xba/0x160 ? __pfx_down_write_killable+0x10/0x10 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4+0x16/0x30 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x2d4/0x4a0 ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10 ? fget+0x1bf/0x270 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x40c/0x690 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x16/0x30 ? __pfx_ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 ? _raw_spin_trylock+0xbb/0x130 ? __pfx__raw_spin_trylock+0x10/0x10 __x64_sys_mmap+0x135/0x1e0 x64_sys_c ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-64581 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: fix sk_dst_cache double-free in xfrm_user_policy() xfrm_user_policy() clears the socket dst cache with __sk_dst_reset(), i.e. the non-atomic __sk_dst_set(sk, NULL): it reads sk_dst_cache with rcu_dereference_protected(), stores NULL and dst_release()s the old dst. That is only safe if no other thread modifies sk_dst_cache concurrently. For a connected UDP socket that does not hold: the transmit fast path (udp_sendmsg -> sk_dst_check -> sk_dst_reset) resets the cache locklessly with an atomic xchg(). A per-socket policy change racing a send can make both sides observe the same old dst and each dst_release() it, dropping the socket's single reference twice and freeing the xfrm_dst bundle while it is still referenced: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801897b6c0 by task exploit/155 Call Trace: ... dst_release (... ./include/linux/rcuref.h:109) xfrm_user_policy (./include/net/sock.h:2239 ./include/net/sock.h:2256 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:3053) do_ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1347) ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1417) do_sock_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2368) __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393) __x64_sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2396) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Reachable by an unprivileged user via a user+network namespace. Use the atomic sk_dst_reset() so the cache is cleared and released with a single xchg(): whichever side wins releases the dst once, the other sees NULL and does nothing. Behaviour is otherwise unchanged. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64580 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm6: clear dst.dev on error to avoid double netdev_put in xfrm6_fill_dst() On the error path where in6_dev_get(dev) returns NULL, xfrm6_fill_dst() releases the device reference with netdev_put() but leaves xdst->u.dst.dev set. dst_destroy() later calls netdev_put(dst->dev) again, so the same net_device reference is released twice, underflowing its refcount (ref_tracker WARNING + "unregister_netdevice: waiting for <dev> to become free"). Clear xdst->u.dst.dev after the netdev_put(), the same way the XFRM device-offload paths xfrm_dev_state_add() and xfrm_dev_policy_add() in net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c NULL ->dev when releasing the reference on error. ref_tracker: reference already released. ref_tracker: allocated in: xfrm6_fill_dst (net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:86) ... udpv6_sendmsg (net/ipv6/udp.c:1696) ... ref_tracker: freed in: xfrm6_fill_dst (net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:90) ... WARNING: lib/ref_tracker.c:322 at ref_tracker_free+0x58b/0x780 dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:115) rcu_core handle_softirqs ... | ||||
| CVE-2026-64576 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nexthop: initialize extack in nh_res_bucket_migrate() nh_res_bucket_migrate() passes an uninitialized netlink_ext_ack to call_nexthop_res_bucket_notifiers(). When nh_notifier_res_bucket_info_init() fails (e.g. the kzalloc returns -ENOMEM), the error is propagated back before any notifier sets extack._msg, and the error path formats the stale pointer with pr_err_ratelimited("%s\n", extack._msg). With CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE this dereferences uninitialized stack memory: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [...] RIP: 0010:string (lib/vsprintf.c:730) vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945) _printk (kernel/printk/printk.c:2504) nh_res_bucket_migrate (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1816) nh_res_table_upkeep (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1866) rtm_new_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3323) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7076) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Zero-initialize extack so _msg is NULL on error paths that never set it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64575 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: tcp: fix double sock release on batch realloc bpf_iter_tcp_batch() releases the current batch via bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch(), which drops the socket refs and rewrites each slot with the socket cookie, then grows the batch. cur_sk/end_sk are kept for bpf_iter_tcp_resume(), but on realloc failure the function returns ERR_PTR() before resume runs, leaving cur_sk < end_sk over slots that now hold cookies rather than sock pointers. bpf_iter_tcp_seq_stop() then calls bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch() again and dereferences a cookie as a struct sock. Empty the batch on the failure path so stop() does not release it again. The sockets were already freed by the first bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch(), so nothing leaks, and a later read() rescans the bucket from the start instead of skipping it. The sibling GFP_NOWAIT failure path still holds real socket references and is left for stop() to release. BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __sock_gen_cookie Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000059 by task exploit ... __sock_gen_cookie (net/core/sock_diag.c:28) bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2918) bpf_iter_tcp_seq_stop (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:3270) bpf_seq_read (kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c:205) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception | ||||
| CVE-2026-64574 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: tear down new links on vif update error path When ieee80211_vif_update_links() adds new links it allocates a link container for each and calls ieee80211_link_init() (which registers the per-link debugfs files with file->private_data pointing into the container) and ieee80211_link_setup(). If the subsequent drv_change_vif_links() fails, the error path restores the old pointers and jumps to 'free', which frees the new containers but never removes their debugfs entries or stops the links. The debugfs files survive with file->private_data dangling at the freed container, so a later open()+read() (e.g. link-1/txpower) dereferences freed memory in ieee80211_if_read_link(), a use-after-free. The removal path already dismantles links correctly via ieee80211_tear_down_links(), which removes each link's keys and debugfs entries and calls ieee80211_link_stop(); the add path on the error branch does not. Commit be1ba9ed221f ("wifi: mac80211: avoid weird state in error path") hardened this same error path for the link-removal case (new_links == 0) but left the newly-added links' teardown unaddressed. drv_change_vif_links() can fail at runtime on MLO drivers (internal allocation / queue / firmware command failures). Remove the new links' debugfs entries and stop them before freeing. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011290000 by task exploit/145 Call Trace: ... ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) short_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:373) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a RIP: 0010:ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception | ||||
| CVE-2026-64570 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix fils_discovery double free on alloc failure ieee80211_set_fils_discovery() calls kfree_rcu() on the old template before allocating the replacement. If the kzalloc() then fails, it returns -ENOMEM while link->u.ap.fils_discovery still points at the object already queued for freeing. A later update or AP teardown (ieee80211_stop_ap()) re-queues that same rcu_head; the second free is caught by KASAN when the RCU sheaf is processed in softirq: BUG: KASAN: double-free in rcu_free_sheaf (mm/slub.c:5850) Free of addr ffff88800c065280 by task swapper/0/0 ... __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare (mm/slub.c:2634 mm/slub.c:2940) rcu_free_sheaf (mm/slub.c:5850) rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2869) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 Queue the old object for kfree_rcu() only after the new one is published, matching ieee80211_set_probe_resp() and ieee80211_set_s1g_short_beacon(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64564 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: don't free the ASCONF's own transport in DEL-IP processing sctp_process_asconf() caches the transport the ASCONF chunk is processed against in asconf->transport (== chunk->transport, set once in sctp_rcv()). For an ASCONF located through its Address Parameter by __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(), that cached transport corresponds to the Address Parameter, which need not be the packet's source address. sctp_process_asconf_param() rejects a DEL-IP for the packet source address (ADDIP D8, SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP), but nothing protects asconf->transport. A single ASCONF can therefore carry, in order: [Address Parameter L] [DEL-IP L] [DEL-IP 0.0.0.0] where L differs from the source. The DEL-IP for L passes the D8 check and calls sctp_assoc_rm_peer() on the transport that asconf->transport still points at, freeing it (RCU-deferred). The following wildcard DEL-IP then reuses the now-dangling asconf->transport in sctp_assoc_set_primary() and sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(): set_primary() dereferences the freed transport (->ipaddr, ->state) and plants the dangling pointer into asoc->peer.primary_path / active_path, and del_nonprimary_peers(), keeping only the pointer that is no longer on the list, removes every real transport, leaving the association with a transport_count of 0 and primary_path/active_path pointing at freed memory. Reject a DEL-IP that targets the transport the ASCONF is being processed against, mirroring the existing source-address guard, so the wildcard branch can never reuse a freed transport. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64563 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rhashtable: clear stale iter->p on table restart rhashtable_walk_start_check() has two restart paths when resuming a walk. When iter->walker.tbl is valid, it re-validates iter->p against the table and sets iter->p = NULL if the object is gone. When iter->walker.tbl is NULL (table was freed during resize), it resets slot and skip but forgets to clear iter->p. rhashtable_walk_next() then dereferences the stale iter->p, reading freed memory. This is a use-after-free. Any caller that does multi-fragment rhashtable walks across walk_stop/walk_start boundaries is affected. Concrete cases include netlink_diag (__netlink_diag_dump in net/netlink/diag.c) and TIPC (tipc_nl_sk_walk in net/tipc/socket.c). Crash stack (netlink_diag): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rhashtable_walk_next+0x365/0x3c0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801a9d2438 (freed kmalloc-2k, offset 1080) Call Trace: rhashtable_walk_next+0x365/0x3c0 (lib/rhashtable.c:1016) __netlink_diag_dump+0x160/0x760 (net/netlink/diag.c:122) netlink_diag_dump+0xc2/0x240 netlink_dump+0x5bc/0x1270 netlink_recvmsg+0x7a3/0x980 sock_recvmsg+0x1bc/0x200 __sys_recvfrom+0x1d4/0x2c0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-64562 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nVMX: Hide shadow VMCS right after VMCLEAR free_nested() frees the shadow VMCS while vmcs01 still points to it. But because it is asynchronous with respect to loaded_vmcs_clear(), the vCPU might migrate before the pointer is cleared and __loaded_vmcs_clear() may then execute VMCLEAR. The VMCS needs to stay attached until its explicit VMCLEAR completes, but then it can be hidden and the page safely freed. | ||||