When an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --> and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Vendor Workaround
Reject or rewrite the -- sequence in untrusted text before passing it to Saxy.XML.comment/1, for example by replacing -- with - -. Alternatively, stop emitting untrusted data as XML comments. Comments carry no semantic payload for consumers, so the text can usually be moved into an element or a CDATA section instead.
Tracking
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Fri, 06 Nov 2026 10:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. Saxy.Encoder does not neutralize the -- sequence in XML comment content: escape_comment/2 returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single -, so neither an interior -- nor a full --> is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the <!-- and --> delimiters. When an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --> and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. | |
| Title | XML comment injection in Saxy encoder via unescaped double hyphen | |
| First Time appeared |
Qcam
Qcam saxy |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-91 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Qcam
Qcam saxy |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-06T10:16:42.053Z
Reserved: 2026-07-24T14:10:01.114Z
Link: CVE-2026-66293
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-06T11:17:16.057
Modified: 2026-11-06T11:17:16.057
Link: CVE-2026-66293
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-11-06T17:30:08Z
-
CWE-91
XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)