| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3, native MQTT and MQTT over WebSocket behind a trusted PROXY Protocol frontend could lose the proxy-derived client address before the MQTT authentication path checked loopback_users, causing the frontend-to-broker address to be treated as loopback. An attacker who can reach the trusted frontend and has valid credentials for a loopback-restricted account can therefore bypass the source-address restriction; the issue does not bypass password authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9 , 4.1.14, 4.0.24, and 3.13.18, Federation upstream in RabbitMQ skips vhost authorization allowing cross-vhost message access. what the bug lets you do. A policymaker on one vhost reads and drains messages out of another vhost it has no permission on. With the default ack-mode the source messages are consumed (deleted), not copied. Why that should not 1. Federation validates the upstream URI without any vhost-access Cross-vhost message read/drain from a per-vhost policymaker, breaking vhost tenancy This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9 , 4.1.14, 4.0.24, and 3.13.18. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.2.0 until 4.3.3 and 4.2.9, OAuth2 Client Secret Exposed via Unauthenticated JavaScript Endpoint (CWE-200). when OAuth2 authentication is enabled for the RabbitMQ Management UI and the configured flow, IDP use a client secret, the oauthclientsecret configuration value is included in the JavaScript served by the unauthenticated endpoint /js/oidc-oauth/bootstrap.js. Any user who can reach the management UI port can retrieve the OAuth2 client secret without Files: deps/rabbitmqmanagement/src/rabbitmgmtwmauth.erl, line 186 deps/rabbitmqmanagement/src/rabbitmgmtoauthbootstrap.erl, lines 35-50 deps/rabbitmqmanagement/src/rabbitmgmtdispatcher.erl, lines 45-49 (route registration) Code Path: 1. The route /js/oidc-oauth/bootstrap.js is registered as a plain Cowboy handler (rabbitmgmtdispatcher.erl:46): Credential exposure for the affected configuration: OAuth2 client secret is accessible without any authentication Token theft: Attacker can complete the authorization code flow using stolen authorization codes Client impersonation: Attacker can make requests. Any RabbitMQ deployment with: This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3 and 4.2.9. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18, JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS (CWE-252). the JWKS key fetching mechanism in uaajwt.erl does not validate the HTTP response status code when downloading signing keys from the OAuth2 provider's JWKS endpoint. Non-200 responses (including 4xx and 5xx errors) are processed identically to successful responses. When the JWKS endpoint returns an error response with a valid-JSON body that lacks a keys field, all previously cached signing keys are destroyed, causing a persistent authentication denial of Files: deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwt.erl, lines 50-63 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwks.erl, lines 5-7 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/rabbitoauth2provider.erl, lines 98-107 Bug 1: HTTP status code ignored (uaajwt.erl:50-63): The Erlang httpc module returns {ok, {{HttpVersion, StatusCode, ReasonPhrase}, Headers, Body}}. The pattern {ok, {, , JwksBody}} matches ANY successful HTTP transaction Persistent authentication DoS: Once keys are destroyed, ALL OAuth2/JWT authentication fails for all users until a new successful JWKS refresh occurs Amplification: A single attacker can deny access to all legitimate OAuth2 users across the entire RabbitMQ. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.1.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, and 4.1.11, Stream Management Super-Stream Binding Keys Allocation Allows Low-Privilege Node Denial of Service. rabbitMQ 4.3.1 with rabbitmqstreammanagement enabled accepts PUT /api/stream/super-streams/{vhost}/{name} requests from an authenticated management user that can access the target vhost. When the request body contains the binding-keys field, the handler parses the attacker-controlled comma-separated string and builds the full stream-name list before checking whether the user has permission to configure the resulting streams. A low-privileged management user with vhost access but no configure, write, or read permission can therefore force large transient allocations before the resource permission check. In a 768 MB memory-limited container, one HTTP PUT with about 4.5 MB of JSON body killed the RabbitMQ container with Docker state exited true An authenticated low-privileged management user can kill a memory-limited RabbitMQ node with one HTTP This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, and 4.1.11. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, Atom table exhaustion via management API node field. pUT /api/queues/:vhost/:name (and the exchanges and bindings endpoints) accepts a node JSON field. The value goes through rabbitnodes:make → listtoatom with no cluster membership check first. Each unique value permanently leaks one atom. A March 2026 refactoring (ea61ce2563) introduced safe helpers in rabbitmgmtnodes.erl (parsenodename, safeatom, and requirenodename, using binarytoexistingatom) and fixed several callers (QQ replica ops, wmauthattempts, wmnodememoryets, getsortreverse, and rabbitfederationmgmt), but getnode/1 in rabbitmgmtutil.erl:880-885, the primary vector used by directrequest/6, was not Roughly 900K requests crash the VM via systemlimit, and all tenants lose Any user with the management tag and one vhost, the lowest privilege This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5, RabbitMQ Management rendered an AMQP authorization-error reason containing an attacker-controlled queue name as HTML when the OAuth management UI was enabled. Exploitation requires an attacker with queue configure permission, a management administrator who can see but cannot read that queue, and the administrator clicking Get Message(s). A queue name containing a base element can then retarget the automatic relative refresh because the Content Security Policy omits base-uri and connect-src, and an attacker endpoint that permits the management origin through CORS can receive the victim's Authorization header. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1, The shovel management resource's is_authorized/2 delegates to rabbit_mgmt_util:is_authorized_monitor/2, which accepts the monitoring tag. But allowed_methods includes DELETE, and delete_resource/2 deletes / restarts shovel runtime parameters with no additional role check. A monitoring user , intended to have read-only visibility , can therefore delete or restart any shovel in any vhost they can see. A read-only monitoring user can delete or restart any dynamic shovel , a state-changing operation that the equivalent /api/parameters endpoint correctly restricts to policymaker. Preconditions include rabbitmq_shovel + rabbitmq_shovel_management plugins enabled Attacker has credentials with the monitoring tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5, RabbitMQ OAuth credential refresh retains revoked runtime tags. when an existing AMQP connection refreshes from an OAuth token that grants the impersonator tag to a valid same-username token that no longer grants that tag, RabbitMQ updates the OAuth backend implementation (token/scopes/expiry) but leaves the connection's runtime #user.tags unchanged. rabbitaccesscontrol:checkuserid/2 then still honors the stale impersonator tag, so the connection (including newly opened channels) can continue publishing messages with a foreign AMQP userid after that privilege should have been revoked. A fresh connection using the downgraded token correctly refuses the same publish, proving the defect is stale session state rather than the token Limited to connections that once held impersonator and successfully refresh to a downgraded same-username rabbitauthbackendoauth2 (or an equivalent refresh-capable backend that returns tags) is enabled for This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.0.0 until 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3, the optional rabbitmq_jms_topic_exchange plugin's x-jms-topic exchange accepted a client-controlled rjms_erlang_selector binding expression whose LIKE evaluator expanded percent and underscore wildcards into overlapping PCRE fragments. It executed those fragments with raw re:run/3 without match or recursion limits, allowing an authenticated tenant that can bind and publish to consume broker scheduler CPU and deny service with pathological selectors. This issue is fixed in versions 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.2.0 until 4.2.9 and 4.3.3, AMQP 1.0 management exchange.declare skips alternate-exchange permission check. pUT /exchanges/:name (lines 192-240) checks only configure on the declared exchange and passes XArgs straight to rabbitexchange:declare/7. It omits the checkreadpermitted(X) + checkwritepermitted(AE) that rabbitchannel.erl:2540-2548 enforces for the alternate-exchange argument on the AMQP 0-9-1 path. The same file already implements the analogous DLX check for queues (lines 708-719), confirming this is a missing-check bug rather than intentional A user with only configure on exchange X can route X's unroutable messages into an alternate exchange they have no write permission AMQP 1.0 enabled (default in RabbitMQ 4.x) Attacker has configure on at least one exchange but lacks write on the target. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.9 and 4.3.3. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, the Web STOMP WebSocket handler enforced neither max_frame_size nor login_timeout before authentication, allowing an unauthenticated client to keep a connection alive with a slow stream of small frames and accumulate unbounded pre-authentication state. The rabbitmq_web_stomp plugin must be enabled, and no authentication is required to reach the vulnerable path. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, protected tag bypass via bulk-delete. dELETE /api/users/:name refuses to delete users tagged protected (rabbitmgmtwmuser:deleteresource/2 checks isprotecteduser). POST /api/users/bulk-delete iterates the supplied username list and calls rabbitauthbackendinternal:deleteuser/2 directly , that function has no protected-tag check , so the guard is silently An administrator can delete protected-tagged service accounts via the bulk endpoint, bypassing a safeguard the test suite confirms is rabbitmqmanagement enabled Attacker has the administrator tag A protected-tagged user. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.0.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, and 4.0.23, AMQP 1.0 management GET /bindings exposes full binding topology to any authenticated AMQP user without resource/management permission checks. the AMQP 1.0 HTTP-over-AMQP management endpoint GET /bindings (the rabbitamqpmanagement handler) enumerates bindings between an arbitrary source exchange and destination queue/exchange in the caller's virtual host without performing any resource-level permission check. Unlike every sibling operation in the same module (which call checkresourceaccess / bindingchecks), the GET handler ignores the authenticated User and returns the binding list unchanged. As a result, any authenticated AMQP 1.0 client that can open a management link pair , including users with no management/monitoring/policymaker/administrator tag , can enumerate the complete binding topology (source exchanges, destination queues/exchanges, routing keys, and binding arguments) of the virtual host they can access. The equivalent HTTP management API (GET /api/bindings) Confidentiality impact: a non-management AMQP 1.0 user can enumerate the complete routing topology of any virtual host it can connect to , every (source exchange, destination queue/exchange, routing key, binding arguments) This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, and 4.0.23. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, When no CA bundle is available, ssl_options/1 falls back to [{verify, verify_none}] with no warning. An attacker in a man-in-the-middle position can forge the JWKS response, which leads the broker to accept arbitrary JWTs. Preconditions include The OAuth2 plugin must be in use with no cacertfile configured and the OS CA bundle empty or unreadable (for example, in a minimal container), and the attacker must hold a network man-in-the-middle position.. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The trust-store plugin installs a verify_fun that overrides {bad_cert, unknown_ca} / {bad_cert, selfsigned_peer} when the presented cert "matches" a whitelisted one. The match key is extract_issuer_id/1 → public_key:pkix_issuer_id/2 → {IssuerName, SerialNumber} , both fields are taken verbatim from the presented certificate body and contain no public-key, SKI, fingerprint or signature material. is_whitelisted/1 is a pure ets:member lookup; the stored full DER is used only for list/0 display and is never compared against the presented cert. cacerts is [], so the whitelisted cert is never used as a trust anchor for path validation either. TLS client-authentication bypass: an attacker who knows the issuer DN + serial of any whitelisted certificate can connect with a forged self-signed cert. Preconditions include rabbitmq_trust_store plugin enabled and used as the TLS verify_fun Attacker knows or can guess the {Issuer, Serial} of at least one whitelisted cert (non-secret; exposed via CLI/logs/any cert copy). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, The runtime-parameters lookup path coerces the URL :component segment to an atom with rabbit_data_coercion:to_atom/1 in lookup_component/1 (deps/rabbit/src/rabbit_runtime_parameters.erl), creating a new atom for any previously unseen value. A safe helper, rabbit_registry:binary_to_type/1, which uses binary_to_existing_atom with a catch, already exists but is not used at this call site. lookup_component/1 calls rabbit_data_coercion:to_atom(Component) on the :component segment of the request URL, converting an attacker-supplied string into a new atom. Because the Erlang atom table is bounded and atoms are never garbage collected, an authorized policymaker issuing roughly one million requests with distinct component values can exhaust the atom table and crash the node, resulting in a denial of service. Preconditions include Exploitation requires policymaker privileges and roughly one million requests.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, parse_array_primitive/2 for constructor 0x45 (list0) returns an element with byte-width B = 0. The enclosing array32 parser at line 148 reads a 4-byte Count from the wire and loops Count times consuming B bytes each , with B = 0, no input is consumed and the loop builds a list of Count empty elements bounded only by the 32-bit field. The SASL-mechanisms / SASL-init frame is parsed by amqp10_framing:decode_bin/1 from rabbit_amqp_reader.erl:412 before authentication completes. The pre-auth incoming_max_frame_size (default 8192 bytes) caps the frame, not the Count field, so a 19-byte payload with Count = 0xFFFFFFFF is accepted. No max_heap_size is set on the reader process. An unauthenticated network attacker can crash any RabbitMQ node that has the AMQP 1.0 listener enabled (default port 5672) by sending a single ~19-byte frame. The reader process attempts to build a list of ~4 billion empty elements, exhausting heap memory and terminating the Erlang VM. All tenants and protocols on the node lose service. Preconditions include Network reachability to the AMQP listener (port 5672, enabled by default) No authentication required. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, The management UI uses EJS 1.0 in which <%= ... %> does NOT HTML-escape. connection.ejs:135 renders <%= connection.ssl_details.peer_cert_subject %> (and peer_cert_issuer) directly into the page. The same pattern appears in streamConnection.ejs:102,106,110. The values come from rabbit_ssl:peer_cert_subject/1 which formats the DN as a string without HTML escaping. The verifier corrected the original researcher's claim: this is reachable only when the listener is configured with verify_peer (so the certificate must be signed by a CA in the broker's trust store, not arbitrary self-signed); however, in deployments using mTLS for client authentication, any user who can request a certificate from the organisational CA controls the Subject CN. An attacker who can obtain a TLS client certificate signed by a CA the broker trusts (with verify_peer enabled) can embed JavaScript in the certificate's Subject DN. When any administrator views that connection in the management UI, the script executes in the admin's browser session, allowing full account takeover (create users, export definitions, etc.). The management UI's CSP includes 'unsafe-inline', so inline script execution is not blocked. Preconditions include TLS listener configured with ssl_options.verify = verify_peer Attacker can obtain a CA-signed client certificate with attacker-chosen Subject (e.g. self-service corporate PKI, or rabbitmq_trust_store plugin in use) Administrator views the connection detail page. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.0.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, and 4.0.23, Shovel does not format state logged by the crash reporter and can leave unencrypted credentials in a crash dump file. the shovel worker genserver processes does not implement the formatstatus/2 callback. When these processes crash (e.g., due to network partitions, connection failures), the OTP SASL error handler writes the full process state , including plaintext AMQP passwords and URIs , to the error log. This is particularly severe for the shovel worker, which stores deobfuscated plaintext URIs (including amqp://user:password@host format) in its genserver state for the entire process Automatic Credential Exposure: Shovel worker crashes (common during network partitions) automatically write plaintext upstream/downstream passwords to error logs No Special Configuration Needed: Unlike DEBUG logging, SASL error reports are always active Broad. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, and 4.0.23. |
