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Search Results (110971 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89739 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc3: gadget: Fix use-after-free in dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints due to race condition In dwc3_gadget_init_endpoint, &dep->nostream_work is bound with dwc3_nostream_work, and dwc3_gadget_endpoint_stream_event can queue this delayed work on system_percpu_wq when a DEPEVT_STREAM_NOSTREAM event is received. If we remove the gadget, dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints makes cleanup and the memory allocated for dep with kzalloc() is released by kfree(dep), while the delayed work mentioned above may still be pending or running. The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows: CPU0 CPU1 | dwc3_thread_interrupt | dwc3_endpoint_interrupt | dwc3_gadget_endpoint_stream_event | queue_delayed_work(system_percpu_wq, | &dep->nostream_work) dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints | dwc3_free_trb_pool(dep) | list_del(&dep->endpoint.ep_list) | dwc3_debugfs_remove_endpoint_dir(dep) | kfree(dep) | // dep is freed | | dwc3_nostream_work | // use dep (use-after-free) Fix it by canceling the delayed work before kfree(dep) in dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89560 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: landlock: Require LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG for whiteout creation Whiteout objects are used in the upper layer of an OverlayFS to indicate that the file with this name does not exist in the unified view, even if it is present in one of the lower layer file systems. For the userspace implementations of OverlayFS (fuse-overlayfs), whiteout objects can be created from userspace as well: * mknod(2) with S_IFCHR and makedev(0, 0) * renameat2(2) with RENAME_WHITEOUT, creating the whiteout in the old place of the moved file. This commit guards whiteout creation in both of these cases with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG. Whiteout objects are *not* considered character devices and are not bound to a driver. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG describes the same permission class as a whiteout object: creating one is the only S_IFCHR creation that the VFS exempts from CAP_MKNOD, so it is as unprivileged as creating a regular file, while LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK keep meaning the creation of devices that expose a kernel interface [1]. For the mknod(2) case, introduce a Landlock erratum. The creation of whiteout objects through mknod(2) was previously guarded using LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR, and it is now guarded using LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG. For the renameat2(2) case, fix a bug: Before this commit, renameat2(2) with RENAME_WHITEOUT would create a directory entry even when all LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* rights were denied. This does not affect normal renames within layered OverlayFS mounts: When doing a regular rename() on a mounted fuse-overlayfs, it is the fuse-overlayfs daemon that exercises renameat2() with RENAME_WHITEOUT, and only the Landlock domain of that daemon is checked there. Depends-on: 49c9e09d9610 ("landlock: Fix handling of disconnected directories") Depends-on: fe72ce6710cb ("landlock: Add errata documentation section") [mic: Record why LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG is the matching right, and add link(2) to the user doc] | ||||
| CVE-2026-89503 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix subbuf resize race with ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() is racy with ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set, it can allocate a reader page with an outdated order. This isn't a big issue, the user can still re-allocate a new reader page and try again. However, what is more problematic is if the value of subbuf_order changes in the middle of ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(). In that case, bpage->order might not match the actual allocated memory. Use bpage->order for the allocation to prevent this race. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89500 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Make cpu_buffer::free_page a buffer_data_read_page Discarding a cached reader page after a concurrent ring buffer resize uses the new global subbuf_order for the free_pages() call. This mismatched order may crashes the kernel or leaks memory because the cached page was allocated under the old size. Save the actual free_page order alongside the page address to ensure we always refer to the correct value and do not rely on the potentially stalled cpu_buffer->subbuf_order value. The simplest is to make free_page a buffer_data_read_page which already covers exactly what we need: a page address and a page order. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89445 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Fix UAF in selftest IOPF reporting IOMMUFD selftest TRIGGER_IOPF borrows an attach handle from group->pasid_array without synchronizing against PASID detach, then a concurrent iommu_report_device_fault() can dereference that borrowed handle's domain pointer after the detach erases the handle and frees the backing struct iommufd_attach_handle. TRIGGER_IOPF then dereferences the freed handle, causing a UAF. Fix by adding a iopf_rwsem in mock_dev to follow the expected design of a real driver. Hold its read side across the whole iommu_report_device_fault() call, and its write side around every path that attaches, detaches, or replaces a device domain. This can block new reports and drains in-flight reports before an old attach handle or the IOPF fault parameter can be removed. Also take the write side while registering a mock device, since it can invoke the mock driver's default-domain attach callback. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81015 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86/amd/pmc: Fix LPS0 and debugfs leaks when STB init fails amd_pmc_probe() registers the LPS0 s2idle handler with acpi_register_lps0_dev() and creates the driver's debugfs directory before calling amd_stb_s2d_init(), which is the last step in probe that can fail. When amd_stb_s2d_init() fails (for example the S2D telemetry region cannot be ioremapped on a long-running system, or the SMU rejects the S2D setup) the error path only calls pci_dev_put() and returns. This leaves amd_pmc_s2idle_dev_ops on the global lps0_s2idle_devops_head list and leaks the debugfs directory, while the devm-managed resources backing the handler are torn down. Reloading the module then walks the corrupted list in acpi_register_lps0_dev() and hits: list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev, but was NULL. kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! acpi_register_lps0_dev+0x44/0x80 amd_pmc_probe+0x224/0x380 [amd_pmc] platform_probe+0x67/0x90 Even without a reload, the stale registration means the next s2idle transition calls into torn-down driver state. Unwind the debugfs directory and the LPS0 registration on the amd_stb_s2d_init() error path. acpi_unregister_lps0_dev() is safe to call unconditionally here: it is guarded on the same conditions as acpi_register_lps0_dev(), which is exactly what amd_pmc_remove() already relies on. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80521 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Unlink scc_entry in unix_del_edge(). Kyle Zeng reported that GC could free a dead SCC partially. The scenario is as follows: 1) Create two SCCs: X -. A <-> B ^--' 2) Run the following concurrently: 2-1) send() sk-B to sk-B from sk-X 2-2) close() both A and B At 2-1), there is a small window where unix_add_edges() publishes a new edge (B <-> B) to GC but its skb is not queued by skb_queue_tail(). If 2-2) completes before skb_queue_tail() and GC is triggered, it judges A <-> B as dead, but B is not freed because GC cannot collect the not-yet-queued skb holding the B <-> B edge. X -. A <-> B -. This edge is visible ^--' ^..' but skb is not This itself is not a problem since the next GC run will judge B as dead as well and free it finally. X -. A <.> B -. ^--' ^--' However, X's SCC forces the next GC to call unix_walk_scc_fast(), and it iterates over A through B's scc_entry. Let's unlink scc_entry before freeing the vertex in unix_del_edge(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72485 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: platform: defer connection counter increment until alloc succeeds coresight_add_out_conn() increments nr_outconns before calling devm_krealloc_array() and again before devm_kmalloc(). If either allocation fails, the counter is already bumped while the corresponding array entry is NULL or uninitialized garbage. coresight_add_in_conn() has the same problem with nr_inconns and devm_krealloc_array(). In both cases the probe returns -ENOMEM, which causes coresight_get_platform_data() to call coresight_release_platform_data() for cleanup. That function iterates up to nr_outconns (or nr_inconns) entries and dereferences each pointer unconditionally, hitting the NULL or garbage entry and panicking instead of failing gracefully. Fix by moving the counter increments to after all allocations succeed, so the struct is always consistent on any error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72315 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix busy dentry warning on unmount after DIO Commit c68337442f03 ("cifs: Fix busy dentry used after unmounting") fixed the issue in cifs where deferred close of a file led to a dentry reference count not being released in umount, by flushing deferredclose_wq in cifs_kill_sb() to solve it. However, the cifs DIO path suffers from the same busy-dentry problem caused by a delayed dentry reference-count release: [dio] [cifsd] [close + umount] netfs_unbuffered_write_iter_locked ... cifs_demultiplex_thread netfs_unbuffered_write cifs_issue_write netfs_wait_for_in_progress_stream [1] ... netfs_write_subrequest_terminated netfs_subreq_clear_in_progress netfs_wake_collector // wake [1] netfs_put_subrequest netfs_put_request queue_work(system_dfl_wq, xxx) [2] // dio write return cifs_close _cifsFileInfo_put // cfile->count 2->1 --cfile->count [3] // umount cifs_kill_sb kill_anon_super // warning triggered! shrink_dcache_for_umount [4] [system_dfl_wq] [5] netfs_free_request ... _cifsFileInfo_put // cfile->count 1->0 --cfile->count queue_work(fileinfo_put_wq, xxx) [fileinfo_put_wq] [6] cifsFileInfo_put_work cifsFileInfo_put_final dput If the umount path is triggered before [5], it results warning: BUG: Dentry 00000000eab1f070{i=9a917b66ae404fec,n=test} still in use (1) [unmount of cifs cifs] The existing per-inode ictx->io_count wait in cifs_evict_inode() does not help: it lives in the inode eviction path, which runs after shrink_dcache_for_umount() has already warned about the busy dentries. Fix it by adding a per-superblock outstanding-rreq counter that is incremented in cifs_init_request() and decremented in cifs_free_request(). In cifs_kill_sb(), before kill_anon_super(), wait for this counter to reach 0 - which guarantees that all cleanup_work for this sb have run and thus all relevant cfile puts are queued on fileinfo_put_wq or serverclose_wq. Then drain the workqueue so the dentry refs are dropped. This is a targeted wait, not a flush of the system-wide system_dfl_wq. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68097 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities set_ntacl_dacl() validates sid.num_subauth before copying an ACE, but does not verify that the declared ACE size contains all sub-authorities described by that field. An undersized ACE can therefore be copied and later make the POSIX ACL deduplication walk inspect data beyond the copied ACE boundary. The existing initial bound check is also too small. It only ensures that the ACE size field is accessible before set_ntacl_dacl() reads sid.num_subauth farther into the input buffer. Require enough input for the fixed SID header before accessing num_subauth, reject ACEs smaller than that header, and skip ACEs whose declared size cannot contain the complete SID. This makes the validation consistent with the other ACE walk paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53359 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected role Commit 0cb2af2ea66ad ("KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected GFN") fixed a shadow paging mismatch between stored and computed GFNs; the bug could be triggered by changing a PDE mapping from outside the guest, and then deleting a memslot. The rmap_remove() call would miss entries created after the PDE change because the GFN of the leaf SPTE does not match the GFN of the struct kvm_mmu_page. A similar hole however remains if the modified PDE points to a non-leaf page. In this case the gfn can be made to match, but the role does not match: the original large 2MB page creates a kvm_mmu_page with direct=1, while the new 4KB needs a kvm_mmu_page with direct=0. However, kvm_mmu_get_child_sp() does not compare the role, and therefore reuses the page. The next step is installing a leaf (4KB) SPTE on the new path which records an rmap entry under the gfn resolved by the walk. But when that child is zapped its parent kvm_mmu_page has direct=1 and kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn() computes the gfn for the 4KB page as sp->gfn + index instead of using sp->shadowed_translation[] (or sp->gfns[] in older kernels). It therefore fails to remove the recorded entry. When the memslot is dropped the shadow page is freed but the rmap entry survives, as in the scenario that was already fixed. Code that later walks that gfn (dirty logging, MMU notifier invalidation, and so on) dereferences an sptep that lies in the freed page, causing the use-after-free. | ||||
| CVE-2025-38349 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: don't decrement ep refcount while still holding the ep mutex Jann Horn points out that epoll is decrementing the ep refcount and then doing a mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx); afterwards. That's very wrong, because it can lead to a use-after-free. That pattern is actually fine for the very last reference, because the code in question will delay the actual call to "ep_free(ep)" until after it has unlocked the mutex. But it's wrong for the much subtler "next to last" case when somebody *else* may also be dropping their reference and free the ep while we're still using the mutex. Note that this is true even if that other user is also using the same ep mutex: mutexes, unlike spinlocks, can not be used for object ownership, even if they guarantee mutual exclusion. A mutex "unlock" operation is not atomic, and as one user is still accessing the mutex as part of unlocking it, another user can come in and get the now released mutex and free the data structure while the first user is still cleaning up. See our mutex documentation in Documentation/locking/mutex-design.rst, in particular the section [1] about semantics: "mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure even after it has internally released the lock already - so it's not safe for another context to acquire the mutex and assume that the mutex_unlock() context is not using the structure anymore" So if we drop our ep ref before the mutex unlock, but we weren't the last one, we may then unlock the mutex, another user comes in, drops _their_ reference and releases the 'ep' as it now has no users - all while the mutex_unlock() is still accessing it. Fix this by simply moving the ep refcount dropping to outside the mutex: the refcount itself is atomic, and doesn't need mutex protection (that's the whole _point_ of refcounts: unlike mutexes, they are inherently about object lifetimes). | ||||
| CVE-2025-21759 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: mcast: extend RCU protection in igmp6_send() igmp6_send() can be called without RTNL or RCU being held. Extend RCU protection so that we can safely fetch the net pointer and avoid a potential UAF. Note that we no longer can use sock_alloc_send_skb() because ipv6.igmp_sk uses GFP_KERNEL allocations which can sleep. Instead use alloc_skb() and charge the net->ipv6.igmp_sk socket under RCU protection. | ||||
| CVE-2024-47702 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fail verification for sign-extension of packet data/data_end/data_meta syzbot reported a kernel crash due to commit 1f1e864b6555 ("bpf: Handle sign-extenstin ctx member accesses"). The reason is due to sign-extension of 32-bit load for packet data/data_end/data_meta uapi field. The original code looks like: r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff->data */ r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* load __sk_buff->data_end */ r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 > r0 goto +1 ... Note that __sk_buff->data load has 32-bit sign extension. After verification and convert_ctx_accesses(), the final asm code looks like: r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208) r2 = (s32)r2 r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80) r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 > r0 goto pc+1 ... Note that 'r2 = (s32)r2' may make the kernel __sk_buff->data address invalid which may cause runtime failure. Currently, in C code, typically we have void *data = (void *)(long)skb->data; void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end; ... and it will generate r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208) r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80) r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 > r0 goto pc+1 If we allow sign-extension, void *data = (void *)(long)(int)skb->data; void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end; ... the generated code looks like r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208) r2 <<= 32 r2 s>>= 32 r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80) r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 > r0 goto pc+1 and this will cause verification failure since "r2 <<= 32" is not allowed as "r2" is a packet pointer. To fix this issue for case r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff->data */ this patch added additional checking in is_valid_access() callback function for packet data/data_end/data_meta access. If those accesses are with sign-extenstion, the verification will fail. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000c90eee061d236d37@google.com/ | ||||
| CVE-2024-40979 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix kernel crash during resume Currently during resume, QMI target memory is not properly handled, resulting in kernel crash in case DMA remap is not supported: BUG: Bad page state in process kworker/u16:54 pfn:36e80 page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x36e80 page dumped because: nonzero _refcount Call Trace: bad_page free_page_is_bad_report __free_pages_ok __free_pages dma_direct_free dma_free_attrs ath12k_qmi_free_target_mem_chunk ath12k_qmi_msg_mem_request_cb The reason is: Once ath12k module is loaded, firmware sends memory request to host. In case DMA remap not supported, ath12k refuses the first request due to failure in allocating with large segment size: ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi firmware request memory request ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 7077888 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 8454144 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi dma allocation failed (7077888 B type 1), will try later with small size ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi delays mem_request 2 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi firmware request memory request Later firmware comes back with more but small segments and allocation succeeds: ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 262144 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 65536 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 Now ath12k is working. If suspend is triggered, firmware will be reloaded during resume. As same as before, firmware requests two large segments at first. In ath12k_qmi_msg_mem_request_cb() segment count and size are assigned: ab->qmi.mem_seg_count == 2 ab->qmi.target_mem[0].size == 7077888 ab->qmi.target_mem[1].size == 8454144 Then allocation failed like before and ath12k_qmi_free_target_mem_chunk() is called to free all allocated segments. Note the first segment is skipped because its v.addr is cleared due to allocation failure: chunk->v.addr = dma_alloc_coherent() Also note that this leaks that segment because it has not been freed. While freeing the second segment, a size of 8454144 is passed to dma_free_coherent(). However remember that this segment is allocated at the first time firmware is loaded, before suspend. So its real size is 524288, much smaller than 8454144. As a result kernel found we are freeing some memory which is in use and thus cras ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2023-53999 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: TC, Fix internal port memory leak The flow rule can be splited, and the extra post_act rules are added to post_act table. It's possible to trigger memleak when the rule forwards packets from internal port and over tunnel, in the case that, for example, CT 'new' state offload is allowed. As int_port object is assigned to the flow attribute of post_act rule, and its refcnt is incremented by mlx5e_tc_int_port_get(), but mlx5e_tc_int_port_put() is not called, the refcnt is never decremented, then int_port is never freed. The kmemleak reports the following error: unreferenced object 0xffff888128204b80 (size 64): comm "handler20", pid 50121, jiffies 4296973009 (age 642.932s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 03 f0 00 00 04 00 00 00 ................ 98 77 67 41 81 88 ff ff 98 77 67 41 81 88 ff ff .wgA.....wgA.... backtrace: [<00000000e992680d>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0x120 [<000000009e945a98>] mlx5e_tc_int_port_get+0x3f3/0xe20 [mlx5_core] [<0000000035a537f0>] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x473/0xcf0 [mlx5_core] [<0000000070c2cec6>] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x7cf/0xe90 [mlx5_core] [<000000005cc84048>] mlx5e_configure_flower+0xd40/0x4c40 [mlx5_core] [<000000004f8a2031>] mlx5e_rep_indr_offload.isra.0+0x10e/0x1c0 [mlx5_core] [<000000007df797dc>] mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_tc_cb+0x90/0x130 [mlx5_core] [<0000000016c15cc3>] tc_setup_cb_add+0x1cf/0x410 [<00000000a63305b4>] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x38f/0x670 [cls_flower] [<000000008bc9e77c>] fl_change+0x1fd5/0x4430 [cls_flower] [<00000000e7f766e4>] tc_new_tfilter+0x867/0x2010 [<00000000e101c0ef>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fc/0x9f0 [<00000000e1111d44>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360 [<0000000082dd6c8b>] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 [<00000000fc568f70>] netlink_sendmsg+0x794/0xc50 [<0000000016e92590>] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 So fix this by moving int_port cleanup code to the flow attribute free helper, which is used by all the attribute free cases. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53851 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/dp: Drop aux devices together with DP controller Using devres to depopulate the aux bus made sure that upon a probe deferral the EDP panel device would be destroyed and recreated upon next attempt. But the struct device which the devres is tied to is the DPUs (drm_dev->dev), which may be happen after the DP controller is torn down. Indications of this can be seen in the commonly seen EDID-hexdump full of zeros in the log, or the occasional/rare KASAN fault where the panel's attempt to read the EDID information causes a use after free on DP resources. It's tempting to move the devres to the DP controller's struct device, but the resources used by the device(s) on the aux bus are explicitly torn down in the error path. The KASAN-reported use-after-free also remains, as the DP aux "module" explicitly frees its devres-allocated memory in this code path. As such, explicitly depopulate the aux bus in the error path, and in the component unbind path, to avoid these issues. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/542163/ | ||||
| CVE-2023-53762 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF in hci_disconnect_all_sync Use-after-free can occur in hci_disconnect_all_sync if a connection is deleted by concurrent processing of a controller event. To prevent this the code now tries to iterate over the list backwards to ensure the links are cleanup before its parents, also it no longer relies on a cursor, instead it always uses the last element since hci_abort_conn_sync is guaranteed to call hci_conn_del. UAF crash log: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_set_powered_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5424) [bluetooth] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888009d9c000 by task kworker/u9:0/124 CPU: 0 PID: 124 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc1+ #10 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xdd/0x160 ? hci_set_powered_sync+0x2c9/0x4a0 [bluetooth] kasan_report+0xa6/0xe0 ? hci_set_powered_sync+0x2c9/0x4a0 [bluetooth] ? __pfx_set_powered_sync+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth] hci_set_powered_sync+0x2c9/0x4a0 [bluetooth] ? __pfx_hci_set_powered_sync+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth] ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_set_powered_sync+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth] hci_cmd_sync_work+0x137/0x220 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x526/0x9d0 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 worker_thread+0x92/0x630 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x196/0x1e0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 </TASK> Allocated by task 1782: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 hci_conn_add+0xa5/0xa80 [bluetooth] hci_bind_cis+0x881/0x9b0 [bluetooth] iso_connect_cis+0x121/0x520 [bluetooth] iso_sock_connect+0x3f6/0x790 [bluetooth] __sys_connect+0x109/0x130 __x64_sys_connect+0x40/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 695: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x14d/0x2e0 device_release+0x5d/0xf0 kobject_put+0xdf/0x270 hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x274/0x3a0 [bluetooth] hci_event_packet+0x579/0x7e0 [bluetooth] hci_rx_work+0x287/0xaa0 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x526/0x9d0 worker_thread+0x92/0x630 kthread+0x196/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 ================================================================== | ||||
| CVE-2023-53707 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix integer overflow in amdgpu_cs_pass1 The type of size is unsigned int, if size is 0x40000000, there will be an integer overflow, size will be zero after size *= sizeof(uint32_t), will cause uninitialized memory to be referenced later. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53627 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: hisi_sas: Grab sas_dev lock when traversing the members of sas_dev.list When freeing slots in function slot_complete_v3_hw(), it is possible that sas_dev.list is being traversed elsewhere, and it may trigger a NULL pointer exception, such as follows: ==>cq thread ==>scsi_eh_6 ==>scsi_error_handler() ==>sas_eh_handle_sas_errors() ==>sas_scsi_find_task() ==>lldd_abort_task() ==>slot_complete_v3_hw() ==>hisi_sas_abort_task() ==>hisi_sas_slot_task_free() ==>dereg_device_v3_hw() ==>list_del_init() ==>list_for_each_entry_safe() [ 7165.434918] sas: Enter sas_scsi_recover_host busy: 32 failed: 32 [ 7165.434926] sas: trying to find task 0x00000000769b5ba5 [ 7165.434927] sas: sas_scsi_find_task: aborting task 0x00000000769b5ba5 [ 7165.434940] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(00000000769b5ba5) aborted [ 7165.434964] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(00000000c9f7aa07) ignored [ 7165.434965] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(00000000e2a1cf01) ignored [ 7165.434968] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 7165.434972] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(0000000022d52d93) ignored [ 7165.434975] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(0000000066a7516c) ignored [ 7165.434976] Mem abort info: [ 7165.434982] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 7165.434991] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 7165.434992] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 7165.434993] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 7165.434994] Data abort info: [ 7165.434994] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 7165.434995] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 7165.434997] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000f29543f2 [ 7165.434998] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000 [ 7165.435003] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 7165.439863] Process scsi_eh_6 (pid: 4109, stack limit = 0x00000000c43818d5) [ 7165.468862] pstate: 00c00009 (nzcv daif +PAN +UAO) [ 7165.473637] pc : dereg_device_v3_hw+0x68/0xa8 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [ 7165.479443] lr : dereg_device_v3_hw+0x2c/0xa8 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [ 7165.485247] sp : ffff00001d623bc0 [ 7165.488546] x29: ffff00001d623bc0 x28: ffffa027d03b9508 [ 7165.493835] x27: ffff80278ed50af0 x26: ffffa027dd31e0a8 [ 7165.499123] x25: ffffa027d9b27f88 x24: ffffa027d9b209f8 [ 7165.504411] x23: ffffa027c45b0d60 x22: ffff80278ec07c00 [ 7165.509700] x21: 0000000000000008 x20: ffffa027d9b209f8 [ 7165.514988] x19: ffffa027d9b27f88 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 7165.520276] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 7165.525564] x15: ffff0000091d9708 x14: ffff0000093b7dc8 [ 7165.530852] x13: ffff0000093b7a23 x12: 6e7265746e692067 [ 7165.536140] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000bb0 [ 7165.541429] x9 : ffff00001d6238f0 x8 : ffffa027d877af00 [ 7165.546718] x7 : ffffa027d6329600 x6 : ffff7e809f58ca00 [ 7165.552006] x5 : 0000000000001f8a x4 : 000000000000088e [ 7165.557295] x3 : ffffa027d9b27fa8 x2 : 0000000000000000 [ 7165.562583] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000003000188e [ 7165.567872] Call trace: [ 7165.570309] dereg_device_v3_hw+0x68/0xa8 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [ 7165.575775] hisi_sas_abort_task+0x248/0x358 [hisi_sas_main] [ 7165.581415] sas_eh_handle_sas_errors+0x258/0x8e0 [libsas] [ 7165.586876] sas_scsi_recover_host+0x134/0x458 [libsas] [ 7165.592082] scsi_error_handler+0xb4/0x488 [ 7165.596163] kthread+0x134/0x138 [ 7165.599380] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 7165.602940] Code: d5033e9f b9000040 aa0103e2 eb03003f (f9400021) [ 7165.609004] kernel fault(0x1) notification starting on CPU 75 [ 7165.700728] ---[ end trace fc042cbbea224efc ]--- [ 7165.705326] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception To fix the issue, grab sas_dev lock when traversing the members of sas_dev.list in dereg_device_v3_hw() and hisi_sas_release_tasks() to avoid concurrency of adding and deleting member. When ---truncated--- | ||||