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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68135 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hip04: fix RX buffer leak on build_skb failure When build_skb() fails in hip04_rx_poll(), the driver jumps to the refill path without releasing the current RX buffer and its DMA mapping. Installing a replacement buffer then overwrites the slot references and leaks both resources. Keep the current slot intact and return budget so NAPI retries the same buffer. Also free a newly allocated RX fragment when dma_map_single() fails. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68131 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rbd: Reset positive result codes to zero in object map update path In a reply message to an RBD request, a positive result code indicates a data payload, which is not allowed for writes. While rbd_osd_req_callback() already resets a positive result code for writes to zero, rbd_object_map_callback() does not. This allows a corrupted reply to an object map update to trigger the rbd_assert(*result < 0) in __rbd_obj_handle_request(). This happens, because rbd_object_map_callback() calls rbd_obj_handle_request() -> __rbd_obj_handle_request() and passes this positive result code. From __rbd_obj_handle_request(), rbd_obj_advance_write() is called, which leaves the positive result code unchanged and returns true. Therefore, the if(done && *result) branch is executed in __rbd_obj_handle_request() and the assertion triggers. This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the logic in the rbd_object_map_callback() path. A positive result code for an object map update is now reset to zero (similar to rbd_osd_req_callback()), and the message is subsequently handled the same way as if the result code was zero from the beginning. Additionally, a WARN_ON_ONCE() is added for this case. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68125 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as assoclen += datalen - authlen; where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame. The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction. Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68124 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.6 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only: if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) { dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR; } else { dev->rxlen = c; dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; ... } A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c; dev->rxpos++; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) { dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER; } With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded. Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path. Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur. KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this change): UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370 index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]' BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0 mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf tty_ldisc_receive_buf flush_to_ldisc Allocated by task 152: alloc_netdev_mqs mctp_serial_open v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr). Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68123 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openvswitch: fix GSO userspace truncation underflow OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment. A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy(). Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a consumer handles it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68117 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path in tipc_sk_create() When tipc_sk_create() fails to insert the new socket (tipc_sk_insert() returns non-zero), its error path frees the sk with sk_free() but leaves sock->sk pointing at the freed object: if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) { sk_free(sk); pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n"); return -EINVAL; } This is harmless for plain socket(): the syscall layer clears sock->ops before releasing, so tipc_release() is never called. It is not harmless on the accept() path. tipc_accept() creates the pre-allocated child socket with tipc_sk_create(net, new_sock, 0, kern); on failure it leaves new_sock->sk dangling and new_sock->ops non-NULL, and do_accept() then fput()s the new file, so __sock_release() -> tipc_release() runs lock_sock(new_sock->sk) on the freed sk -- a use-after-free write of the sk_lock spinlock. tipc_release() already guards this exact "failed accept() releases a pre-allocated child" case with "if (sk == NULL) return 0;", but the guard is bypassed because tipc_sk_create() left sock->sk non-NULL (dangling) rather than NULL. Clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path so the existing tipc_release() NULL check fires and the use-after-free is avoided. The tipc_sk_insert() failure is reached when the per-netns socket rhashtable hits its max_size (tsk_rht_params.max_size = 1048576, ~2M elements) -- i.e. once a netns holds ~2M TIPC sockets every insert returns -E2BIG. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839) Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880047cdc38 by task init/1 lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839) tipc_release (net/tipc/socket.c:638) __sock_release (net/socket.c:710) sock_close (net/socket.c:1501) __fput (fs/file_table.c:512) Allocated by task 1: sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2308) tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:487) tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744) do_accept (net/socket.c:2034) Freed by task 1: __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2391) tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:504) tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744) do_accept (net/socket.c:2034) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68115 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/gfx10: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit ac6f00beb658239bced4aaed9efbb04a35348d48) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68111 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/gfx9: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit b71604f8685b0eba07866f4e8dc30f93e1931054) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68106 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix division by zero with invalid uvd dimensions When width or height is less than 16, width_in_mb or height_in_mb becomes 0, leading to fs_in_mb being 0. This causes a division by zero when calculating num_dpb_buffer in H264 and H264 Perf decode paths. Add validation to reject frames with width < 16 or height < 16 before performing any calculations that depend on these values. V2: Format change - move up all vaiable definitions. V3: Use warn_once to avoid spam. (cherry picked from commit 3e41d26c70b0a459d041cc19482a226c4b7423cb) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68093 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.6 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Bump asid_generation on CPU online to avoid ASID collision after hotplug If a vCPU stays scheduled out (or blocked) while the last pCPU it ran on goes through a hotplug cycle (online->offline->online), and the vCPU then resumes execution on the same pCPU, then it is possible for it to run with an ASID that has now been assigned to a different vCPU, resulting in stale TLB translations being used. svm_enable_virtualization_cpu() resets asid_generation to 1 and sets next_asid to max_asid + 1 on every CPU online event, including hotplug cycles. Because next_asid starts beyond the pool boundary, the first call to new_asid() after an online event always wraps the pool, incrementing asid_generation to 2 and assigning ASIDs starting from min_asid. Consider two vCPUs from different VMs, vCPU-A pinned to CPU-X holding asid_generation=2 and ASID=N from before the hotplug event: 1. CPU-X goes offline and back online: asid_generation resets to 1, next_asid = max_asid + 1. 2. One or more vCPUs migrate to CPU-X and call new_asid(), wrapping the pool and consuming ASIDs starting from min_asid. Eventually vCPU-B from a different VM is assigned asid_generation=2, ASID=N — the same ASID that vCPU-A held before the hotplug. 3. vCPU-A enters pre_svm_run() on CPU-X: current_vmcb->cpu is unchanged so the migration branch is skipped. Its saved asid_generation=2 matches sd->asid_generation=2, so the generation check silently passes and vCPU-A continues running with ASID=N — the same ASID just freshly assigned to vCPU-B. Both vCPUs from different VMs now run on CPU-X with the same ASID, causing them to share NPT TLB entries and producing stale translations. The collision manifests as a KVM internal error (Suberror: 1, emulation failure). The NPT page fault reports a faulting GPA far outside the VM's physical memory range — a sign of stale TLB translations being used. KVM falls back to instruction emulation, which fails on FPU/XSave instructions (XRSTOR, STMXCSR) that the emulator does not implement. Fix this by incrementing asid_generation instead of resetting it to 1 in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu(). On module load, asid_generation starts at 0 (memset) and the increment produces 1, identical to the old behaviour. On subsequent hotplug cycles the generation advances beyond any value a vCPU previously observed on this CPU, so the generation check in pre_svm_run() reliably forces new_asid() on every vCPU after every hotplug cycle. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64584 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_midi: cancel pending IN work before freeing the midi object The f_midi driver embeds a work item (midi->work) whose handler, f_midi_in_work(), dereferences the enclosing struct f_midi through container_of(). This work is armed from two sites: f_midi_complete(), on a normal IN-endpoint completion, and f_midi_in_trigger(), on an ALSA rawmidi output-stream start. Neither f_midi_disable() nor f_midi_unbind() cancels midi->work. f_midi_disable() only disables the endpoints and drains the in_req_fifo; it does not synchronize the work item, and the sound card is released asynchronously to the final free of the midi object. The midi object is reference-counted (midi->free_ref) and is freed in f_midi_free() only once both the usb_function reference and the rawmidi private_data reference have been dropped. In f_midi_unbind(), f_midi_disable() runs before the sound card is released, so while the USB endpoints are already disabled the rawmidi device is still usable by an open substream. A concurrent userspace write on such a substream can reach f_midi_in_trigger() and queue midi->work again after f_midi_disable() has returned. A work item armed this way may still be pending when the last reference drops and f_midi_free() proceeds to kfree(midi), letting f_midi_in_work() dereference the struct after it has been freed, a use-after-free. For this reason cancelling midi->work in f_midi_disable() would not be sufficient: the ALSA trigger path can rearm the work after disable() returns. Cancelling at the refcount-zero free site is the boundary after which neither arming source can survive, because by then both references that keep the midi object alive have been dropped: the USB endpoints are already disabled and the rawmidi device has been released. Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync(&midi->work) in the refcount-zero block of f_midi_free(), before the embedded work_struct is freed along with the rest of the structure. opts->lock is a sleeping mutex, so calling cancel_work_sync() under it is permitted, and the handler takes midi->transmit_lock rather than opts->lock, so no self-deadlock can occur while it waits for a running instance of the work to finish. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64579 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: policy: preallocate inexact bins before xfrm_hash_rebuild reinsert xfrm_hash_rebuild()'s first loop preallocates the bins/chains the reinsert loop needs, so the reinsert (after hlist_del_rcu()) cannot allocate or fail. But its guard is inverted: it skips policies with prefixlen < threshold and preallocates for the rest. prefixlen < threshold is exactly when policy_hash_bysel() returns NULL and the reinsert takes the allocating xfrm_policy_inexact_insert() path. So the loop preallocates for the exact policies (which never allocate) and skips the inexact ones, whose bin/node is then allocated GFP_ATOMIC during reinsert. On failure the error path only WARN_ONCE()s and continues, leaving a poisoned bydst node; the next rebuild's hlist_del_rcu() dereferences LIST_POISON2 and takes a GPF. Reachable under memory pressure, deterministic via failslab. Invert the guard so preallocation covers exactly the reinserted policies; the reinsert then allocates nothing and cannot fail. Crash: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c0000000024: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead...] ... Workqueue: events xfrm_hash_rebuild RIP: 0010:xfrm_hash_rebuild+0x5b3/0x1190 RAX: dead000000000122 (LIST_POISON2 + offset) ... Call Trace: hlist_del_rcu (include/linux/rculist.h:599) xfrm_hash_rebuild (net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1365) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt | ||||
| CVE-2026-64578 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate compound request size before reading StructureSize2 When ksmbd validates a compound (chained) SMB2 request, ksmbd_smb2_check_message() reads pdu->StructureSize2 without first checking that the compound element is large enough to contain it. StructureSize2 is a 2-byte field at offset 64 (__SMB2_HEADER_STRUCTURE_SIZE) from the start of each element. The compound-walking logic only guarantees that a full 64-byte SMB2 header is present for the trailing element: when NextCommand is 0, len is reduced to the number of bytes remaining after next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off. A remote client can craft a compound request whose last element has exactly 64 bytes, so the 2-byte StructureSize2 read at offset 64 extends one byte past the receive buffer, producing a slab-out-of-bounds read. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402) Read of size 2 at addr ffff888012ae31ac by task kworker/0:1/14 The buggy address is located 172 bytes inside of allocated 173-byte region Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402) handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:119) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Reject any compound element that is too small to hold StructureSize2 before dereferencing it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64577 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gtp: check skb_pull_data() return in gtp1u_send_echo_resp() gtp1u_send_echo_resp() ignores skb_pull_data()'s return value. Its caller gtp1u_udp_encap_recv() only guarantees 16 bytes (udphdr + gtp1_header), but the pull requests 20 (gtp1_header_long + udphdr). For a 16-19 byte echo request the pull fails and returns NULL without advancing skb->data; execution continues, and the following skb_push() plus the IP header pushed by iptunnel_xmit() move skb->data below skb->head, tripping skb_under_panic(). Fix it by dropping the packet when skb_pull_data() fails. skbuff: skb_under_panic: ... kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! Call Trace: skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:2648) iptunnel_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82) gtp_encap_recv (drivers/net/gtp.c:701 drivers/net/gtp.c:808 drivers/net/gtp.c:920) udp_queue_rcv_one_skb (net/ipv4/udp.c:2388) ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt | ||||
| CVE-2026-64575 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: tcp: fix double sock release on batch realloc bpf_iter_tcp_batch() releases the current batch via bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch(), which drops the socket refs and rewrites each slot with the socket cookie, then grows the batch. cur_sk/end_sk are kept for bpf_iter_tcp_resume(), but on realloc failure the function returns ERR_PTR() before resume runs, leaving cur_sk < end_sk over slots that now hold cookies rather than sock pointers. bpf_iter_tcp_seq_stop() then calls bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch() again and dereferences a cookie as a struct sock. Empty the batch on the failure path so stop() does not release it again. The sockets were already freed by the first bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch(), so nothing leaks, and a later read() rescans the bucket from the start instead of skipping it. The sibling GFP_NOWAIT failure path still holds real socket references and is left for stop() to release. BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __sock_gen_cookie Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000059 by task exploit ... __sock_gen_cookie (net/core/sock_diag.c:28) bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2918) bpf_iter_tcp_seq_stop (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:3270) bpf_seq_read (kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c:205) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception | ||||
| CVE-2026-64573 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: qca: fix NVM tag length underflow in TLV parser In the TLV_TYPE_NVM branch of qca_tlv_check_data() the tag loop bound is "while (idx < length - sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm))". "length" is a signed int from the firmware TLV header and sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm) is a size_t (12), so "length" is converted to size_t and any firmware-supplied "length" < 12 makes the subtraction wrap to a huge value. The loop body then reads a 12-byte struct tlv_type_nvm past the end of the short vmalloc'd firmware buffer (and the EDL_TAG_ID_* handlers can write past it). Rewrite the bound as "idx + sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm) <= length"; both operands are non-negative, so it no longer underflows and a "length" too small for one record correctly skips the loop. BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in qca_download_firmware.isra.0 (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:421) Read of size 2 at addr ffffc900000e5004 by task kworker/u9:0/52 Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) qca_download_firmware.isra.0 (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:421 drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:617) qca_uart_setup (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:948) qca_setup (drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c:2029) hci_uart_setup (drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c:438) hci_dev_open_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5227) hci_power_on (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:920) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) | ||||
| CVE-2026-64572 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: fib: free fib_alias with kfree_rcu() on insert error path fib_table_insert() publishes new_fa into the leaf's fa_list with fib_insert_alias() before calling the fib entry notifiers. When a notifier fails, the error path removes new_fa with fib_remove_alias() (hlist_del_rcu) and frees it right away with kmem_cache_free(). fib_table_lookup() walks that list under rcu_read_lock() only, so a concurrent lookup that already reached new_fa keeps reading it after the free: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810676d4eb by task exploit/297 Call Trace: fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601) ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu (net/ipv4/route.c:2814) ip_route_output_key_hash (net/ipv4/route.c:2705) __ip4_datagram_connect (net/ipv4/datagram.c:49) udp_connect (net/ipv4/udp.c:2144) __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2167) __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2173) do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe which belongs to the cache ip_fib_alias of size 56 Triggering the error path needs CAP_NET_ADMIN and a registered fib notifier that can reject a route; a netdevsim device whose IPv4 FIB resource is exhausted is enough. Free new_fa with alias_free_mem_rcu(), as fib_table_delete() already does for a fib_alias removed from the trie. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64571 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback() p54_rx_eeprom_readback() copies the requested EEPROM slice out of a device-supplied readback frame without checking that the skb actually holds that many bytes. Commit da1b9a55ff11 ("wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()") closed the destination overflow by copying a fixed priv->eeprom_slice_size (and rejecting a mismatched advertised len), but the source side is still unbounded: nothing verifies the frame is long enough to supply that many bytes. A malicious USB device can send a short frame whose advertised len matches priv->eeprom_slice_size while the payload is truncated. The equality check passes and memcpy() reads past the end of the skb, leaking adjacent heap: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) Read of size 1016 at addr ffff88800f077114 by task swapper/0/0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ... __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) p54u_rx_cb (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c:163) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657) dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005) ... </IRQ> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f0770c0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 84 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff88800f0770c0, ffff88800f077380) Check that the slice fits in the skb before copying. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64569 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mpls: fix NULL deref in mpls_valid_fib_dump_req() on CONFIG_INET=n On CONFIG_INET=n builds, mpls_valid_fib_dump_req() walks the parsed attribute table itself instead of calling ip_valid_fib_dump_req(). The RTA_OIF arm passes tb[RTA_OIF] to nla_get_u32() without checking it is present, so an RTM_GETROUTE dump for AF_MPLS with strict checking and no RTA_OIF hits a NULL dereference. RTM_GETROUTE is RTNL_KIND_GET, which rtnetlink_rcv_msg() permits without CAP_NET_ADMIN, so an unprivileged user can trigger it. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:mpls_valid_fib_dump_req (net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2189) Call Trace: mpls_dump_routes (net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2236) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2331) __netlink_dump_start (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2446) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7033) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900) __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:790) ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2684) ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2738) __sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2770) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Skip unset attributes, as ip_valid_fib_dump_req() does. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64565 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: ims-pcu - fix heap-buffer-overflow in ims_pcu_process_data() The `ims_pcu_process_data()` processes incoming URB data byte by byte. However, it fails to check if the `read_pos` index exceeds IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE. If a malicious USB device sends a packet larger than IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE, `read_pos` will increment indefinitely. Moreover, since `read_pos` is located immediately after `read_buf`, the attacker can overwrite `read_pos` itself to arbitrarily control the index. This manipulated `read_pos` is subsequently used in `ims_pcu_handle_response()` to copy data into `cmd_buf`, leading to a heap buffer overflow. Specifically, an attacker can overwrite the `cmd_done.wait.head` located at offset 136 relative to `cmd_buf` in the `ims_pcu_handle_response()`. Consequently, when the driver calls `complete(&pcu->cmd_done)`, it triggers a control flow hijack by using the manipulated pointer. Fix this by adding a bounds check for `read_pos` before writing to `read_buf`. If the packet is too long, discard it, log a warning, and reset the parser state. [dtor: factor out resetting packet state, reset checksum as well] | ||||