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Search Results (409293 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-53606 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: clean up potential nfsd_file refcount leaks in COPY codepath There are two different flavors of the nfsd4_copy struct. One is embedded in the compound and is used directly in synchronous copies. The other is dynamically allocated, refcounted and tracked in the client struture. For the embedded one, the cleanup just involves releasing any nfsd_files held on its behalf. For the async one, the cleanup is a bit more involved, and we need to dequeue it from lists, unhash it, etc. There is at least one potential refcount leak in this code now. If the kthread_create call fails, then both the src and dst nfsd_files in the original nfsd4_copy object are leaked. The cleanup in this codepath is also sort of weird. In the async copy case, we'll have up to four nfsd_file references (src and dst for both flavors of copy structure). They are both put at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy, even though the ones held on behalf of the embedded one outlive that structure. Change it so that we always clean up the nfsd_file refs held by the embedded copy structure before nfsd4_copy returns. Rework cleanup_async_copy to handle both inter and intra copies. Eliminate nfsd4_cleanup_intra_ssc since it now becomes a no-op. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53600 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tunnels: fix kasan splat when generating ipv4 pmtu error If we try to emit an icmp error in response to a nonliner skb, we get BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip_compute_csum+0x134/0x220 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811c50db00 by task iperf3/1691 CPU: 2 PID: 1691 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #309 [..] kasan_report+0x105/0x140 ip_compute_csum+0x134/0x220 iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp+0x554/0x1020 skb_tunnel_check_pmtu+0x513/0xb80 vxlan_xmit_one+0x139e/0x2ef0 vxlan_xmit+0x1867/0x2760 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1ee/0x4f0 br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x4d1/0x660 [..] ip_compute_csum() cannot deal with nonlinear skbs, so avoid it. After this change, splat is gone and iperf3 is no longer stuck. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53557 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fprobe: Release rethook after the ftrace_ops is unregistered While running bpf selftests it's possible to get following fault: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address \ 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI ... Call Trace: <TASK> fprobe_handler+0xc1/0x270 ? __pfx_bpf_testmod_init+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_bpf_testmod_init+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_fentry_test1+0x5/0x10 ? bpf_fentry_test1+0x5/0x10 ? bpf_testmod_init+0x22/0x80 ? do_one_initcall+0x63/0x2e0 ? rcu_is_watching+0xd/0x40 ? kmalloc_trace+0xaf/0xc0 ? do_init_module+0x60/0x250 ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x120 ? do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc </TASK> In unregister_fprobe function we can't release fp->rethook while it's possible there are some of its users still running on another cpu. Moving rethook_free call after fp->ops is unregistered with unregister_ftrace_function call. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53535 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmgenet: Add a check for oversized packets Occasionnaly we may get oversized packets from the hardware which exceed the nomimal 2KiB buffer size we allocate SKBs with. Add an early check which drops the packet to avoid invoking skb_over_panic() and move on to processing the next packet. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53526 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jbd2: check 'jh->b_transaction' before removing it from checkpoint Following process will corrupt ext4 image: Step 1: jbd2_journal_commit_transaction __jbd2_journal_insert_checkpoint(jh, commit_transaction) // Put jh into trans1->t_checkpoint_list journal->j_checkpoint_transactions = commit_transaction // Put trans1 into journal->j_checkpoint_transactions Step 2: do_get_write_access test_clear_buffer_dirty(bh) // clear buffer dirty，set jbd dirty __jbd2_journal_file_buffer(jh, transaction) // jh belongs to trans2 Step 3: drop_cache journal_shrink_one_cp_list jbd2_journal_try_remove_checkpoint if (!trylock_buffer(bh)) // lock bh, true if (buffer_dirty(bh)) // buffer is not dirty __jbd2_journal_remove_checkpoint(jh) // remove jh from trans1->t_checkpoint_list Step 4: jbd2_log_do_checkpoint trans1 = journal->j_checkpoint_transactions // jh is not in trans1->t_checkpoint_list jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail(journal) // trans1 is done Step 5: Power cut, trans2 is not committed, jh is lost in next mounting. Fix it by checking 'jh->b_transaction' before remove it from checkpoint. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53473 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: improve error handling from ext4_dirhash() The ext4_dirhash() will *almost* never fail, especially when the hash tree feature was first introduced. However, with the addition of support of encrypted, casefolded file names, that function can most certainly fail today. So make sure the callers of ext4_dirhash() properly check for failures, and reflect the errors back up to their callers. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53072 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: use the workqueue to destroy unaccepted sockets Christoph reported a UaF at token lookup time after having refactored the passive socket initialization part: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __token_bucket_busy+0x253/0x260 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810698d5b0 by task syz-executor653/3198 CPU: 1 PID: 3198 Comm: syz-executor653 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc59af4eaa31c1f6c00c8f1e448ed99a45c66340dd5 #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x91 print_report+0x16a/0x46f kasan_report+0xad/0x130 __token_bucket_busy+0x253/0x260 mptcp_token_new_connect+0x13d/0x490 mptcp_connect+0x4ed/0x860 __inet_stream_connect+0x80e/0xd90 tcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x3ce/0x710 mptcp_sendmsg+0xff1/0x1a20 inet_sendmsg+0x11d/0x140 __sys_sendto+0x405/0x490 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc We need to properly clean-up all the paired MPTCP-level resources and be sure to release the msk last, even when the unaccepted subflow is destroyed by the TCP internals via inet_child_forget(). We can re-use the existing MPTCP_WORK_CLOSE_SUBFLOW infra, explicitly checking that for the critical scenario: the closed subflow is the MPC one, the msk is not accepted and eventually going through full cleanup. With such change, __mptcp_destroy_sock() is always called on msk sockets, even on accepted ones. We don't need anymore to transiently drop one sk reference at msk clone time. Please note this commit depends on the parent one: mptcp: refactor passive socket initialization | ||||
| CVE-2022-50755 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: Avoid double brelse() in udf_rename() syzbot reported a warning like below [1]: VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 7301 at fs/buffer.c:1145 __brelse+0x67/0xa0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> invalidate_bh_lru+0x99/0x150 smp_call_function_many_cond+0xe2a/0x10c0 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0 ? __mutex_lock+0x21c/0x12d0 ? smp_call_on_cpu+0x250/0x250 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 ? lock_release+0x587/0x810 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50 on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x3c/0x80 blkdev_flush_mapping+0x13a/0x2f0 blkdev_put_whole+0xd3/0xf0 blkdev_put+0x222/0x760 deactivate_locked_super+0x96/0x160 deactivate_super+0xda/0x100 cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x3d0 task_work_run+0x149/0x240 ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30 do_exit+0xb29/0x2a40 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12a/0x2b0 ? mm_update_next_owner+0x7c0/0x7c0 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 ? zap_other_threads+0x234/0x2d0 do_group_exit+0xd0/0x2a0 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The cause of the issue is that brelse() is called on both ofibh.sbh and ofibh.ebh by udf_find_entry() when it returns NULL. However, brelse() is called by udf_rename(), too. So, b_count on buffer_head becomes unbalanced. This patch fixes the issue by not calling brelse() by udf_rename() when udf_find_entry() returns NULL. | ||||
| CVE-2022-50746 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: validate the extent length for uncompressed pclusters syzkaller reported a KASAN use-after-free: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2ae90e873e97f1faf6f2 The referenced fuzzed image actually has two issues: - m_pa == 0 as a non-inlined pcluster; - The logical length is longer than its physical length. The first issue has already been addressed. This patch addresses the second issue by checking the extent length validity. | ||||
| CVE-2022-50650 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix reference state management for synchronous callbacks Currently, verifier verifies callback functions (sync and async) as if they will be executed once, (i.e. it explores execution state as if the function was being called once). The next insn to explore is set to start of subprog and the exit from nested frame is handled using curframe > 0 and prepare_func_exit. In case of async callback it uses a customized variant of push_stack simulating a kind of branch to set up custom state and execution context for the async callback. While this approach is simple and works when callback really will be executed only once, it is unsafe for all of our current helpers which are for_each style, i.e. they execute the callback multiple times. A callback releasing acquired references of the caller may do so multiple times, but currently verifier sees it as one call inside the frame, which then returns to caller. Hence, it thinks it released some reference that the cb e.g. got access through callback_ctx (register filled inside cb from spilled typed register on stack). Similarly, it may see that an acquire call is unpaired inside the callback, so the caller will copy the reference state of callback and then will have to release the register with new ref_obj_ids. But again, the callback may execute multiple times, but the verifier will only account for acquired references for a single symbolic execution of the callback, which will cause leaks. Note that for async callback case, things are different. While currently we have bpf_timer_set_callback which only executes it once, even for multiple executions it would be safe, as reference state is NULL and check_reference_leak would force program to release state before BPF_EXIT. The state is also unaffected by analysis for the caller frame. Hence async callback is safe. Since we want the reference state to be accessible, e.g. for pointers loaded from stack through callback_ctx's PTR_TO_STACK, we still have to copy caller's reference_state to callback's bpf_func_state, but we enforce that whatever references it adds to that reference_state has been released before it hits BPF_EXIT. This requires introducing a new callback_ref member in the reference state to distinguish between caller vs callee references. Hence, check_reference_leak now errors out if it sees we are in callback_fn and we have not released callback_ref refs. Since there can be multiple nested callbacks, like frame 0 -> cb1 -> cb2 etc. we need to also distinguish between whether this particular ref belongs to this callback frame or parent, and only error for our own, so we store state->frameno (which is always non-zero for callbacks). In short, callbacks can read parent reference_state, but cannot mutate it, to be able to use pointers acquired by the caller. They must only undo their changes (by releasing their own acquired_refs before BPF_EXIT) on top of caller reference_state before returning (at which point the caller and callback state will match anyway, so no need to copy it back to caller). | ||||
| CVE-2022-50490 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Propagate error from htab_lock_bucket() to userspace In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch() if htab_lock_bucket() returns -EBUSY, it will go to next bucket. Going to next bucket may not only skip the elements in current bucket silently, but also incur out-of-bound memory access or expose kernel memory to userspace if current bucket_cnt is greater than bucket_size or zero. Fixing it by stopping batch operation and returning -EBUSY when htab_lock_bucket() fails, and the application can retry or skip the busy batch as needed. | ||||
| CVE-2022-50472 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/mad: Don't call to function that might sleep while in atomic context Tracepoints are not allowed to sleep, as such the following splat is generated due to call to ib_query_pkey() in atomic context. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1888000 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2492 rb_commit+0xc1/0x220 CPU: 0 PID: 1888000 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE --------- - - 4.18.0-305.3.1.el8.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.13.0-2.module_el8.3.0+555+a55c8938 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ib-comp-unb-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core] RIP: 0010:rb_commit+0xc1/0x220 RSP: 0000:ffffa8ac80f9bca0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffff8951c7c01300 RBX: ffff8951c7c14a00 RCX: 0000000000000246 RDX: ffff8951c707c000 RSI: ffff8951c707c57c RDI: ffff8951c7c14a00 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8951c7c01300 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000246 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffff964c70c0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8951fbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f20e8f39010 CR3: 000000002ca10005 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: ring_buffer_unlock_commit+0x1d/0xa0 trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs+0x3b/0x1b0 trace_event_buffer_commit+0x67/0x1d0 trace_event_raw_event_ib_mad_recv_done_handler+0x11c/0x160 [ib_core] ib_mad_recv_done+0x48b/0xc10 [ib_core] ? trace_event_raw_event_cq_poll+0x6f/0xb0 [ib_core] __ib_process_cq+0x91/0x1c0 [ib_core] ib_cq_poll_work+0x26/0x80 [ib_core] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 worker_thread+0x30/0x390 ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 kthread+0x116/0x130 ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ---[ end trace 78ba8509d3830a16 ]--- | ||||
| CVE-2022-50303 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix double release compute pasid If kfd_process_device_init_vm returns failure after vm is converted to compute vm and vm->pasid set to compute pasid, KFD will not take pdd->drm_file reference. As a result, drm close file handler maybe called to release the compute pasid before KFD process destroy worker to release the same pasid and set vm->pasid to zero, this generates below WARNING backtrace and NULL pointer access. Add helper amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_set_vm_pasid and call it at the last step of kfd_process_device_init_vm, to ensure vm pasid is the original pasid if acquiring vm failed or is the compute pasid with pdd->drm_file reference taken to avoid double release same pasid. amdgpu: Failed to create process VM object ida_free called for id=32770 which is not allocated. WARNING: CPU: 57 PID: 72542 at ../lib/idr.c:522 ida_free+0x96/0x140 RIP: 0010:ida_free+0x96/0x140 Call Trace: amdgpu_pasid_free_delayed+0xe1/0x2a0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_driver_postclose_kms+0x2d8/0x340 [amdgpu] drm_file_free.part.13+0x216/0x270 [drm] drm_close_helper.isra.14+0x60/0x70 [drm] drm_release+0x6e/0xf0 [drm] __fput+0xcc/0x280 ____fput+0xe/0x20 task_work_run+0x96/0xc0 do_exit+0x3d0/0xc10 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:ida_free+0x76/0x140 Call Trace: amdgpu_pasid_free_delayed+0xe1/0x2a0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_driver_postclose_kms+0x2d8/0x340 [amdgpu] drm_file_free.part.13+0x216/0x270 [drm] drm_close_helper.isra.14+0x60/0x70 [drm] drm_release+0x6e/0xf0 [drm] __fput+0xcc/0x280 ____fput+0xe/0x20 task_work_run+0x96/0xc0 do_exit+0x3d0/0xc10 | ||||
| CVE-2022-49979 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: fix refcount bug in sk_psock_get (2) Syzkaller reports refcount bug as follows: ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3605 at lib/refcount.c:19 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:19 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 3605 Comm: syz-executor208 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-03023-g7e062cda7d90 #0 <TASK> __refcount_add_not_zero include/linux/refcount.h:163 [inline] __refcount_inc_not_zero include/linux/refcount.h:227 [inline] refcount_inc_not_zero include/linux/refcount.h:245 [inline] sk_psock_get+0x3bc/0x410 include/linux/skmsg.h:439 tls_data_ready+0x6d/0x1b0 net/tls/tls_sw.c:2091 tcp_data_ready+0x106/0x520 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4983 tcp_data_queue+0x25f2/0x4c90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5057 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x1774/0x4e80 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6659 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x339/0x980 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1682 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1061 [inline] __release_sock+0x134/0x3b0 net/core/sock.c:2849 release_sock+0x54/0x1b0 net/core/sock.c:3404 inet_shutdown+0x1e0/0x430 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:909 __sys_shutdown_sock net/socket.c:2331 [inline] __sys_shutdown_sock net/socket.c:2325 [inline] __sys_shutdown+0xf1/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2343 __do_sys_shutdown net/socket.c:2351 [inline] __se_sys_shutdown net/socket.c:2349 [inline] __x64_sys_shutdown+0x50/0x70 net/socket.c:2349 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 </TASK> During SMC fallback process in connect syscall, kernel will replaces TCP with SMC. In order to forward wakeup smc socket waitqueue after fallback, kernel will sets clcsk->sk_user_data to origin smc socket in smc_fback_replace_callbacks(). Later, in shutdown syscall, kernel will calls sk_psock_get(), which treats the clcsk->sk_user_data as psock type, triggering the refcnt warning. So, the root cause is that smc and psock, both will use sk_user_data field. So they will mismatch this field easily. This patch solves it by using another bit(defined as SK_USER_DATA_PSOCK) in PTRMASK, to mark whether sk_user_data points to a psock object or not. This patch depends on a PTRMASK introduced in commit f1ff5ce2cd5e ("net, sk_msg: Clear sk_user_data pointer on clone if tagged"). For there will possibly be more flags in the sk_user_data field, this patch also refactor sk_user_data flags code to be more generic to improve its maintainability. | ||||
| CVE-2022-49554 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zsmalloc: fix races between asynchronous zspage free and page migration The asynchronous zspage free worker tries to lock a zspage's entire page list without defending against page migration. Since pages which haven't yet been locked can concurrently migrate off the zspage page list while lock_zspage() churns away, lock_zspage() can suffer from a few different lethal races. It can lock a page which no longer belongs to the zspage and unsafely dereference page_private(), it can unsafely dereference a torn pointer to the next page (since there's a data race), and it can observe a spurious NULL pointer to the next page and thus not lock all of the zspage's pages (since a single page migration will reconstruct the entire page list, and create_page_chain() unconditionally zeroes out each list pointer in the process). Fix the races by using migrate_read_lock() in lock_zspage() to synchronize with page migration. | ||||
| CVE-2022-49407 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Rhel E4s | 2026-10-15 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dlm: fix plock invalid read This patch fixes an invalid read showed by KASAN. A unlock will allocate a "struct plock_op" and a followed send_op() will append it to a global send_list data structure. In some cases a followed dev_read() moves it to recv_list and dev_write() will cast it to "struct plock_xop" and access fields which are only available in those structures. At this point an invalid read happens by accessing those fields. To fix this issue the "callback" field is moved to "struct plock_op" to indicate that a cast to "plock_xop" is allowed and does the additional "plock_xop" handling if set. Example of the KASAN output which showed the invalid read: [ 2064.296453] ================================================================== [ 2064.304852] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.306491] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800ef227d8 by task dlm_controld/7484 [ 2064.308168] [ 2064.308575] CPU: 0 PID: 7484 Comm: dlm_controld Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0+ #9 [ 2064.310292] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 2064.311618] Call Trace: [ 2064.312218] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b [ 2064.313150] print_address_description.constprop.8+0x21/0x150 [ 2064.314578] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.315610] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.316595] kasan_report.cold.14+0x7f/0x11b [ 2064.317674] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.318687] dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm] [ 2064.319629] ? dev_read+0x4a0/0x4a0 [dlm] [ 2064.320713] ? bpf_lsm_kernfs_init_security+0x10/0x10 [ 2064.321926] vfs_write+0x17e/0x930 [ 2064.322769] ? __fget_light+0x1aa/0x220 [ 2064.323753] ksys_write+0xf1/0x1c0 [ 2064.324548] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0 [ 2064.325464] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 2064.326387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 2064.327606] RIP: 0033:0x7f807e4ba96f [ 2064.328470] Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 39 87 f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 7c 87 f8 ff 48 [ 2064.332902] RSP: 002b:00007ffd50cfe6e0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 2064.334658] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055cc3886eb30 RCX: 00007f807e4ba96f [ 2064.336275] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 RDI: 0000000000000010 [ 2064.337980] RBP: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 2064.339560] R10: 000055cc3886eb30 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000055cc3886eb80 [ 2064.341237] R13: 000055cc3886eb00 R14: 000055cc3886f590 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 2064.342857] [ 2064.343226] Allocated by task 12438: [ 2064.344057] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2064.345079] __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 [ 2064.345933] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13b/0x220 [ 2064.346953] dlm_posix_unlock+0xec/0x720 [dlm] [ 2064.348811] do_lock_file_wait.part.32+0xca/0x1d0 [ 2064.351070] fcntl_setlk+0x281/0xbc0 [ 2064.352879] do_fcntl+0x5e4/0xfe0 [ 2064.354657] __x64_sys_fcntl+0x11f/0x170 [ 2064.356550] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 2064.358259] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 2064.360745] [ 2064.361511] Last potentially related work creation: [ 2064.363957] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2064.365811] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 [ 2064.368100] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70 [ 2064.369785] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm] [ 2064.372404] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm] [ 2064.374607] process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm] [ 2064.377290] process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0 [ 2064.379357] worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0 [ 2064.381188] kthread+0x3ac/0x490 [ 2064.383460] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 2064.385588] [ 2064.386518] Second to last potentially related work creation: [ 2064.389219] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2064.391043] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 [ 2064.393303] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70 [ 2064.394885] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm] [ 2064.397694] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2022-49174 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix ext4_mb_mark_bb() with flex_bg with fast_commit In case of flex_bg feature (which is by default enabled), extents for any given inode might span across blocks from two different block group. ext4_mb_mark_bb() only reads the buffer_head of block bitmap once for the starting block group, but it fails to read it again when the extent length boundary overflows to another block group. Then in this below loop it accesses memory beyond the block group bitmap buffer_head and results into a data abort. for (i = 0; i < clen; i++) if (!mb_test_bit(blkoff + i, bitmap_bh->b_data) == !state) already++; This patch adds this functionality for checking block group boundary in ext4_mb_mark_bb() and update the buffer_head(bitmap_bh) for every different block group. w/o this patch, I was easily able to hit a data access abort using Power platform. <...> [ 74.327662] EXT4-fs error (device loop3): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:1141: group 11, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 21248 vs 23294 free clusters [ 74.533214] EXT4-fs (loop3): shut down requested (2) [ 74.536705] Aborting journal on device loop3-8. [ 74.702705] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc00000005e980000 [ 74.703727] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000007bffb8 cpu 0xd: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000000015db7060] pc: c0000000007bffb8: ext4_mb_mark_bb+0x198/0x5a0 lr: c0000000007bfeec: ext4_mb_mark_bb+0xcc/0x5a0 sp: c000000015db7300 msr: 800000000280b033 dar: c00000005e980000 dsisr: 40000000 current = 0xc000000027af6880 paca = 0xc00000003ffd5200 irqmask: 0x03 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 5167, comm = mount <...> enter ? for help [c000000015db7380] c000000000782708 ext4_ext_clear_bb+0x378/0x410 [c000000015db7400] c000000000813f14 ext4_fc_replay+0x1794/0x2000 [c000000015db7580] c000000000833f7c do_one_pass+0xe9c/0x12a0 [c000000015db7710] c000000000834504 jbd2_journal_recover+0x184/0x2d0 [c000000015db77c0] c000000000841398 jbd2_journal_load+0x188/0x4a0 [c000000015db7880] c000000000804de8 ext4_fill_super+0x2638/0x3e10 [c000000015db7a40] c0000000005f8404 get_tree_bdev+0x2b4/0x350 [c000000015db7ae0] c0000000007ef058 ext4_get_tree+0x28/0x40 [c000000015db7b00] c0000000005f6344 vfs_get_tree+0x44/0x100 [c000000015db7b70] c00000000063c408 path_mount+0xdd8/0xe70 [c000000015db7c40] c00000000063c8f0 sys_mount+0x450/0x550 [c000000015db7d50] c000000000035770 system_call_exception+0x4a0/0x4e0 [c000000015db7e10] c00000000000c74c system_call_common+0xec/0x250 | ||||
| CVE-2022-49159 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Implement ref count for SRB The timeout handler and the done function are racing. When qla2x00_async_iocb_timeout() starts to run it can be preempted by the normal response path (via the firmware?). qla24xx_async_gpsc_sp_done() releases the SRB unconditionally. When scheduling back to qla2x00_async_iocb_timeout() qla24xx_async_abort_cmd() will access an freed sp->qpair pointer: qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-2871:0: Async-gpsc timeout - hdl=63d portid=234500 50:06:0e:80:08:77:b6:21. qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-2853:0: Async done-gpsc res 0, WWPN 50:06:0e:80:08:77:b6:21 qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-2854:0: Async-gpsc OUT WWPN 20:45:00:27:f8:75:33:00 speeds=2c00 speed=0400. qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-28d8:0: qla24xx_handle_gpsc_event 50:06:0e:80:08:77:b6:21 DS 7 LS 6 rc 0 login 1|1 rscn 1|0 lid 5 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004 IP: qla24xx_async_abort_cmd+0x1b/0x1c0 [qla2xxx] Obvious solution to this is to introduce a reference counter. One reference is taken for the normal code path (the 'good' case) and one for the timeout path. As we always race between the normal good case and the timeout/abort handler we need to serialize it. Also we cannot assume any order between the handlers. Since this is slow path we can use proper synchronization via locks. When we are able to cancel a timer (del_timer returns 1) we know there can't be any error handling in progress because the timeout handler hasn't expired yet, thus we can safely decrement the refcounter by one. If we are not able to cancel the timer, we know an abort handler is running. We have to make sure we call sp->done() in the abort handlers before calling kref_put(). | ||||
| CVE-2022-49149 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix call timer start racing with call destruction The rxrpc_call struct has a timer used to handle various timed events relating to a call. This timer can get started from the packet input routines that are run in softirq mode with just the RCU read lock held. Unfortunately, because only the RCU read lock is held - and neither ref or other lock is taken - the call can start getting destroyed at the same time a packet comes in addressed to that call. This causes the timer - which was already stopped - to get restarted. Later, the timer dispatch code may then oops if the timer got deallocated first. Fix this by trying to take a ref on the rxrpc_call struct and, if successful, passing that ref along to the timer. If the timer was already running, the ref is discarded. The timer completion routine can then pass the ref along to the call's work item when it queues it. If the timer or work item where already queued/running, the extra ref is discarded. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98397 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: x86-android-tablets: hold device reference for secondary fwnode teardown In gpio_secondary_fwnode_init(), acpi_bus_find_device_by_name() returns a device reference, but the local dev variable is declared with __free(put_device), dropping the reference at the end of each iteration. Meanwhile, devm_add_action_or_reset() saves the dev pointer for gpio_secondary_unset() without incrementing its reference count, which could lead to a use-after-free during driver teardown if the device is released in the interim. Acquire an explicit device reference with get_device() when registering the devres action, and drop it with put_device() inside gpio_secondary_unset(). | ||||