| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco NX-OS engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in a software hardening release that addresses multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities.
The vulnerabilities tracked by CVE-2026-76459 are related to out-of-bounds write issues that are grouped under the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) CWE-787. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
9p/trans_virtio: reject mount tags longer than NAME_MAX at probe
p9_virtio_probe() reads a 16-bit mount tag length (tag_len) from the
device config and kzalloc()s tag_len + 1 bytes for chan->tag with no
upper bound. A malicious or compromised host can present a tag of up to
65535 bytes; that tag is later copied into the single-page sysfs buffer
by p9_mount_tag_show() (memcpy(buf, chan->tag, tag_len + 1)), a
host-controlled out-of-bounds write of up to ~64 KiB past the PAGE_SIZE
attribute buffer.
Reject an overlong tag at probe time. A 9p mount tag is a name-like
identifier, so bound it by NAME_MAX (255): that limit is independent of
the sysfs/seq_file page size and is far above any legitimate mount tag,
which keeps p9_mount_tag_show() safe at the root without hard-coding a
seq_file implementation detail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost: fix used ring index wrap in vhost_add_used_n_in_order
vhost_add_used_n_in_order() advances start by nheads[i] but wraps it
with a single subtraction. If start + nheads[i] >= 2 * vq->num, start
can remain outside the ring.
With used-ring logging enabled, start > vq->num makes (vq->num - start)
underflow. log_write() then sets bits beyond the dirty-log bitmap,
potentially corrupting adjacent userspace memory. This is reachable on
the vhost-net TX path with VIRTIO_F_IN_ORDER: done_idx can reach
VHOST_NET_BATCH (64), triggering the issue with a 32-entry ring.
Wrap start with a mask to keep it within the ring. VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM
enforces a nonzero power-of-two ring size, allowing start to be wrapped
using & (vq->num - 1). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices
Sending a PF_PACKET bypasses the CAN framework logic and can directly
reach a CAN driver's xmit() function. The PF_PACKET framework only
checks that skb->len does not exceed the net_device MTU.
For a CAN device that is not CAN XL capable, anything above CANFD_MTU
(72 bytes) is therefore dropped before it reaches the driver. However,
CAN XL frames are variable length. can_is_canxl_skb() accepts lengths in
the range CANXL_HDR_SIZE + CANXL_MIN_DLEN up to CANXL_MTU, i.e. 13 to
2060 bytes.
As a result, an ETH_P_CANXL skb with a length between 13 and 72 bytes
can pass both the MTU and the can_dropped_invalid_skb() checks.
A driver that does not support CAN XL will interpret canxl_frame->flags
as a length because of the overlap with can_frame->len. And because
CANXL_XLF is set, the resulting length is between 128 and 255. For
drivers that do not check can_frame->len before copying can_frame->data,
as most drivers do, this results in a buffer overflow of up to 247
bytes.
Drop ETH_P_CANXL skbs if the device does not have the CAN_CAP_XL
capability. Keep can_is_canxl_skb() for the validation of CAN XL skbs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: clamp the inline data length in ceph_fill_inline_data()
The MDS decides how much inline data to attach to a reply, and the
client parses inline_len without any upper bound: ceph_decode_need()
only verifies that the message actually carries that many bytes.
ceph_fill_inline_data() then copies the data into a single folio
with no length check, so a malicious or buggy MDS returning more
inline data than the folio can hold writes past its end.
Clamp the length to folio_size() so both callers, handle_cap_grant()
and fill_inode(), are covered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices
In a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and
write indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as
potentially malicious.
hv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds
checking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset
up to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too:
the available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how
much is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than
the ring.
The fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated
snapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices,
hv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO.
One re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch:
hv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices
trailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an
offset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is
addressed later in the series.
Open-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of
prerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix chunk number of the first chunk in a local quota file
Mounting a crafted OCFS2 image can corrupt kernel memory. When the
local quota file header of such an image claims zero chunks, the first
quota entry allocated during the mount gets a chunk number taken from a
kernel pointer, and releasing that entry clears a bit far outside the
chunk bitmap.
The write will corrupt the data stored at that address, and the
corruption may lead to a system crash or damage unrelated data.
Mounting requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so it takes an untrusted image, such
as removable media or a loop mount of a file from elsewhere.
Since the chunk number comes from a kernel pointer, the address of the
bit that gets cleared differs from boot to boot, and the issue has been
reported under several titles:
- BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KASAN: use-after-free Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KASAN: slab-use-after-free Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KFENCE: use-after-free write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
Note that none of these is a use-after-free in the quota code: the
chunk and its buffer head are alive. The bit that gets cleared lies
far outside the bitmap. KASAN and KFENCE name each report based on the
object occupying that address, which explains why the same issue is
reported under so many different titles. In the report I sent, the
address fell in a free page, which KASAN labels use-after-free.
There are known reproducers. Both a syzkaller and a C reproducer are
available from the Google Drive link [1] in my report thread. The
issue was found by our modified syzkaller, not a theoretical thing
found by an LLM. I have not seen it outside fuzzing, so it is not
affecting me in the real world.
The local quota file in OCFS2 is divided into chunks, and each chunk
begins with a header block holding a bitmap of the quota entries that
chunk has handed out. Chunks are numbered from zero, and that number is
used to convert the file offset of an entry back into a bit position in
the bitmap. ocfs2_local_quota_add_chunk() appends a new chunk to the
in-memory list and numbers it one past the chunk that was last:
list_add_tail(&chunk->qc_chunk, &oinfo->dqi_chunk);
chunk->qc_num = list_entry(chunk->qc_chunk.prev,
struct ocfs2_quota_chunk,
qc_chunk)->qc_num + 1;
The predecessor is looked up after the new chunk is added to the list, so
if the list was empty, the prev pointer is the list head itself. The head
is the dqi_chunk member of struct ocfs2_mem_dqinfo and is not a chunk, so
reading qc_num through it lands 16 bytes past the start of the head, on
the dqi_gqinode pointer that follows it. The first chunk of the file is
then numbered with the lower half of a kernel pointer instead of 0.
The list is empty when the local quota file header claims the file has no
chunks. ocfs2_local_read_info() takes dqi_chunks from that header without
validating it, so an image with dqi_chunks == 0 takes this path when the
first quota entry is allocated.
ocfs2_create_local_dquot() turns the bad number into a file offset with
ol_dqblk_off(), which shifts a 32-bit block number left by the block size
bits, so the top bits of such a large block number are lost.
ocfs2_local_release_dquot() turns the offset back into a bit index with
ol_dqblk_chunk_off(), using the full chunk number, so the lost bits push
that index far outside the bitmap, and clearing it corrupts unrelated
memory.
Compute the chunk number before putting the chunk on the list, and use 0
when the list is empty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: reject out-of-range attribute value lengths in xfs_attr_copy_value
xfs_attr_copy_value() takes the value length as a signed int and, for a
remote xattr, is handed args->rmtvaluelen. That field is filled from the
on-disk __be32 xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote.valuelen in
xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue(), so a crafted length such as 0x80000000 is
stored into the signed rmtvaluelen as a negative number.
The "buffer too small" guard in xfs_attr_copy_value() is a signed
comparison:
if (args->valuelen < valuelen)
return -ERANGE;
A negative valuelen therefore compares as smaller than the caller's
buffer size, skips the -ERANGE path, and is then used as a copy length,
leading to an out-of-bounds copy of a full remote block into a small
getxattr(2) buffer on a mounted crafted image.
Reject a value length that is negative or larger than the maximum xattr
size before it is used, so a bogus on-disk length can no longer slip
through the value copier. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: reject remote xattr entries with an out-of-range value length
xfs_attr3_leaf_verify_entry() validates a remote attribute entry's name
but never bounds its on-disk value length (xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote.
valuelen, a __be32). A crafted leaf with valuelen = 0x80000000 passes
the verifier and the CRC.
That length is later assigned into the signed int args->rmtvaluelen
(xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue), becoming negative, which slips past the signed
-ERANGE check in xfs_attr_copy_value(); a getxattr() with a small buffer
then memcpy()s a full remote block into the small kvalue buffer
(xfs_attr_rmtval_copyout) -- a heap out-of-bounds write with
attacker-controlled content, from an unprivileged getxattr(2) on a
mounted crafted image.
Reject remote entries whose value length exceeds XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX in
the leaf verifier, so the malicious block is rejected at read time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: bound inode fork length against the fork size during log recovery
xlog_recover_inode_commit_pass2() copies an inode log item's data/attr
fork region into the inode buffer using the on-log region length without
bounding it against the fork capacity, e.g.:
len = item->ri_buf[2].iov_len;
memcpy(XFS_DFORK_DPTR(dip), src, len);
The only guard is an ASSERT, which is a no-op on production kernels
(CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG off), and xfs_dinode_verify() runs only after the copy.
A crafted image with a dirty log can therefore drive a heap out-of-bounds
write at mount time. The XFS_ILOG_DBROOT sibling already passes
XFS_DFORK_DSIZE as a bound; the DDATA/DEXT and ADATA/AEXT memcpy paths
did not.
Bound each logged fork region against the destination fork size before
copying it, and reject the log item with -EFSCORRUPTED when it does not
fit. Because the recovered inode is only verified after the fork data has
been copied in, the checks are done up front, before any memcpy into the
on-disk inode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: size directory name conversion buffer correctly
A 2048-byte ASCII directory name needs 4098 bytes when converted to
UTF-16, including the terminator. ksmbd_convert_dir_info_name() caps
its allocation at PATH_MAX and writes past the end of that buffer.
Allocate space for one UTF-16 code unit per input byte plus the
terminator. Use kmalloc_array() to check the size calculation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix buffer overflow in SMB2_tcon()
In SMB2_tcon(), unc_path is allocated with a fixed buffer size of
MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH * 2 bytes (672 bytes). However, the user-controlled
UNC path (tree) length is passed to cifs_strtoUTF16(), which assumes the
destination buffer is large enough and writes strlen(tree) + 1 UTF-16 code
units.
Commit 62a1a439e0fd ("cifs: clean up handling of unc= option") removed the
length check on UNC mount options, allowing mount paths to exceed
MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH while retaining the fixed-size buffer allocation in
SMB2_tcon(). Consequently, an oversized UNC string causes cifs_strtoUTF16()
to write past the end of the heap object, resulting in a slab-out-of-bounds
write. Furthermore, if a tree exceeds MAX_TREE_SIZE characters, strscpy()
truncates it in cifs_tcon::tree_name, causing subsequent reconnects or
failovers to fail.
Fix this by first verifying that the length of tree does not exceed
MAX_TREE_SIZE, returning -EINVAL if it does. Then, dynamically allocate
unc_path based on the length of tree so that it safely accommodates all
UTF-16 code units for paths within MAX_TREE_SIZE.
[pc: remove unused MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: fix oversized GSS proxy token copy
gss_read_proxy_verf() allocates one page per token chunk, but it copies the
entire linear head of an RPC request into in_token->pages[0]. A UDP datagram
can leave more than PAGE_SIZE bytes in the linear head, so a large
RPCSEC_GSS INIT token overwrites following pages.
Copy the linear head in page-sized chunks before switching to the request
page array. The linear head itself can span multiple pages. |
| Improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command in certain ASUS Router firmware models allows an remote attacker to to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges by inducing a logged-in administrator to visit a malicious website.
Refer to the ' Security Update for ASUS Router Firmware ' section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information. |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or corrupt kernel memory. |
| A vulnerability has been found in jprocms up to 1.7.7. Affected by this vulnerability is the function validateParam of the component Expression Language Handler. The manipulation leads to os command injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. |
| A flaw has been found in jprocms up to 1.7.7. Affected is the function StrUtil.format of the component Database Backup Module. Executing a manipulation of the argument host/port/username/password/dbName can lead to os command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service |
| Krita TIFF File Parsing Out-Of-Bounds Write Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Krita. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.
The specific flaw exists within the parsing of TIFF files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a write past the end of an allocated buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-28771. |
| mcp-ssh-manager is an MCP server for managing servers over SSH with human approval, an encrypted vault, and a live audit trail. Prior to 3.6.7, ssh_db_list, ssh_db_dump, ssh_db_import, and ssh_db_restore in src/database-manager.js interpolate caller-controlled database, table, collection, file path, user, host, port, and password values into shell-evaluated command strings without neutralization. Shell metacharacters in these arguments therefore execute arbitrary commands on the configured SSH target as the account used by the MCP server. ssh_db_list is classified as read-only and remains available in readonly and restricted server security modes, so this path bypasses the command-execution boundary those modes are intended to enforce. The dump and import builders are blocked in readonly mode but remain vulnerable in the default unrestricted mode. The earlier version 3.6.5 hardening covered only ssh_db_query query text; it did not protect the list, dump, import, or restore builders, or the connection flags used by query builders. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.7. |