| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Partially overwritten session files can lead to remote code execution.
The files session save handler, which is the default, writes updated session data into the existing session file without first clearing it. If a write is interrupted, the file can contain the beginning of the new session followed by the end of the old one, and bytes of an ordinary string can later be unserialized as objects. An attacker who can influence the session data, for example through session upload progress, and interrupt a write at a suitable point may inject objects, which can lead to code execution when the application contains a suitable gadget chain. Session data can also be corrupted.
This issue affects PHP versions before 8.2.36, 8.3.* before 8.3.37, 8.4.* before 8.4.28 and 8.5.* before 8.5.13. |
| @fastify/rate-limit is the rate-limiting plugin for the Fastify web framework. Starting in version 11.1.0, the plugin documented a manual flow for limiting failed login attempts that peeks at the limiter, runs the password check, and consumes a slot only on failure. Because the peek and the consume are two separate store operations with the password check in between, concurrent requests can all pass the peek before any slot is consumed, so in versions 11.1.0 through 11.2.2 a burst of requests runs far more failed attempts than the configured limit, and the sequential path also allowed one attempt more than configured. The default per-request limiter is not affected. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.3.0, which makes the manual flow atomic by reserving a slot in a single operation and refunding it only on success, and users should upgrade to 11.3.0 or later. |
| Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.8, validate_url_ssrf in src/core/utils.py resolves and checks a hostname but returns the hostname URL rather than the validated address, and session.get in http.get performs an independent DNS lookup when connecting. A low-privileged caller with control of the hostname's DNS can make the first lookup return a public address and the connection-time lookup return an internal address, bypassing the SSRF guard for all modules that call it and exposing readable internal or metadata-service responses. Successful exploitation requires attacker-controlled DNS and a successful timing-dependent answer change between the two lookups. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.8. |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2 privilege escalation of project-scoped access tokens via concurrent project deletion was possible |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/gup: recheck the PUD under PTL in follow_pud_mask()
follow_pud_mask() reads the PUD without a lock. If it is a leaf, it takes
the lock and calls follow_huge_pud(), which reads the entry again, but
only tests whether it is present.
A leaf can be zapped concurrently and a page fault can fill the empty
entry with a page table.
This currently only applies when device-dax makes use of PUD entries,
and the fault after e.g., MADV_DONTNEED would find THPs to be disabled.
That requires a sequence like
1) Fault in the PUD
2) Disable THP
3) Have GUP race against concurrent MADV_DONTNEED + refault
Which is rather unlikely to happen in practice, which is why we never
received a report about such a problem.
Before commit 1b1676180246 ("mm/gup: handle huge pud for
follow_pud_mask()"), we performed that check in follow_devmap_pud() by
testing for pud_devmap().
Let's fix it by just structuring follow_pud_mask() similar to
follow_pmd_mask(), minus protnone stuff that does not apply and minus
FOLL_SPLIT_PMD handling. That makes it much easier to spot any such
inconsistencies.
Perform the pud_bad() check early in follow_pmd_mask() and just forward
the PUD value. We can drop the pud_present() check in follow_huge_pud(),
just like we have in follow_huge_pmd().
Even though we are performing more changes than strictly necessary, the
fix should be easy to backport. |
| Dell Alienware Command Center (AWCC), versions prior to 6.14.105.0, contain a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Code Execution and Elevation of Privilege. |
| Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows Security Account Manager allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows DHCP Server allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Race condition in CredentialProvider in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 158.0.8127.36 allowed a local attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a local program. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Race condition in ServiceManager in Google Chrome prior to 158.0.8127.36 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process and leveraged social engineering to bypass web origin policy via a crafted Chrome extension. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't fix the directory tree if live update fails
LOLLM complains that we don't double-check dl->aborted one last time to
before committing repairs to the filesystem. This is important because
the live update handler could have set ->aborted if it encountered a
runtime error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: prevent deleting the wrong subvolume by ID
When deleting a subvolume by ID, btrfs_ioctl_snap_destroy() first
resolves the requested ID to a name, then looks up that name again
under the parent directory lock.
A concurrent rename can change which subvolume is associated with
the name between these operations. Since the deletion path does not
verify the ID of the resolved subvolume, it can delete a different
subvolume while leaving the requested one intact.
This was reproduced by repeatedly exchanging the names of two
subvolumes using renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE) while deleting one of
them by ID. The wrong subvolume was deleted in 9 out of 14 independent
tests.
Fix this by checking that the resolved subvolume ID matches the
requested ID while holding the parent directory lock. Return -EAGAIN
on a mismatch so that userspace can retry the operation instead of
being told that the requested subvolume does not exist. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: Fix TOCTOU race between GROUP_REGISTERED check and erase
panthor_group_destroy() checks the GROUP_REGISTERED mark and then calls
xa_erase() without holding the xarray lock across both. If the handle is
destroyed by another thread in between, and a concurrent GROUP_CREATE
reuses the freed ID, the first destroy erases and releases the new,
still-initializing group, leading to a use-after-free in
panthor_group_create().
Do the mark check and erase atomically under xa_lock(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_blk: use synchronous quiesce in virtblk_freeze_priv()
blk_mq_run_work_fn() can call blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests() through
blk_mq_run_dispatch_ops(). The dispatcher checks QUEUE_FLAG_QUIESCED
while the flag is clear. It can then be preempted before it gets a
request. At that time, it has no queue usage reference, so
blk_mq_freeze_queue() does not wait for it.
virtblk_freeze_priv() then calls blk_mq_quiesce_queue_nowait() and
blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(). A new request can enter the queue. The old
dispatcher can run again, use its old flag check, get the new request,
and call virtio_queue_rq(). At the same time, virtblk_freeze_priv() can
reset the device, delete the virtqueues, and free vblk->vqs. The old
dispatcher can then use a deleted virtqueue or a NULL vblk->vqs, and the
kernel can crash.
Fix this by using blk_mq_quiesce_queue(), which waits for dispatch code
that was already running. Keep the existing freeze and unfreeze order.
The queue remains quiesced until virtblk_restore_priv() calls
blk_mq_unquiesce_queue(). |
| A flaw was found in crun. When copying files onto a tmpfs mounted with tmpcopyup, crun opens the destination a second time by name. A container that shares a writable volume with the container being created can change that path between the two lookups, so crun copies image files onto host files, including files under /proc/sys. |
| Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Race condition in UI in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 158.0.8127.36 allowed a local attacker leveraging social engineering to obtain cross-origin data via a co-installed app. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Race condition in Core in Google Chrome prior to 158.0.8127.36 allowed a remote attacker to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hwdep: Serialize DSP load requests
The check of the loaded DSP indices and the call of the driver's
dsp_load callback in snd_hwdep_dsp_load() are not serialized. A hwdep
file descriptor can be shared among threads, or inherited across fork,
so two SNDRV_HWDEP_IOCTL_DSP_LOAD requests for the same index can both
observe the index as unloaded and enter the driver's callback
concurrently, even though the device itself is opened exclusively.
This breaks the assumption behind hw->dsp_loaded that a firmware index
is loaded only once. For example, snd-usb-usx2y hits
WARN_ON(usx2y->as04.buffer) in usx2y_async_seq04_init() and may
allocate the US-428 sequence URBs twice.
Serialize the check, the callback invocation and the bookkeeping with a
per-hwdep mutex, so that the second request returns -EBUSY. |
| Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses.
The type="hash" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store's atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type="transaction" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1. |