| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libipw: reject too-short beacon and probe responses
libipw_process_probe_response() and the libipw_network_init() call it
makes assume the frame contains the full 36-byte beacon and probe
response prefix, but the ipw2100 and ipw2200 receive paths only
establish that a management frame carries the generic 24-byte
three-address header.
libipw_network_init() then computes the information element length as
stats->len - sizeof(*beacon)
stats->len is a u16 and sizeof() has type size_t, so the subtraction is
evaluated as size_t and wraps instead of going negative. Truncating
that to the u16 length parameter of libipw_parse_info_param() yields
65524 for a 24-byte beacon, and the parser then walks the receive
buffer as if it held almost 64 KiB of information elements, reading
past the allocation.
Reject the frame before any fixed field is touched.
Found by an AI-assisted review of length arithmetic in management frame
parsers. Verified with a KUnit case under Generic KASAN on arm64 under
QEMU; I do not have the hardware, so it is not tested on a real device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: scpi: bound-check DVFS index in scpi_dvfs_recalc_rate
dvfs_get_idx() may return an out-of-range index if the SCP firmware is
buggy or returns a stale value. Only negative indexes were rejected, so a
large index walked past info->opps and could treat garbage as a clock rate
(KASAN OOB / wrong frequency to consumers). The missing upper bound dates
back to the original SCPI clock driver.
Treat indexes >= opp count as invalid and return 0, same as idx < 0. |
| GNU Aspell contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in ReadOnlyDict::load() in readonly_ws.cpp. When loading a binary .rws dictionary file, it uses offset fields from the file header as byte indices into a heap buffer without validating their bounds. An attacker can trigger this by convincing a user to run aspell with a crafted dictionary file supplied through --master, --dict-dir, or configuration options, leading to heap memory disclosure or a denial of service via application crash.
This issue was fixed in commit 941953b25031bc9104e83f58e138a664b8dedc3f which will be released in version 0.60.8.3. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()
If snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE,
smb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to
sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length
of the server's reply.
Because SMB2_ioctl() places no lower bound on the server-supplied
OutputCount and allocates retbuf to exactly that length, a short reply
results in ret_data_len exceeding the size of retbuf. The subsequent
copy_to_user() then reads past the end of retbuf, leaking adjacent slab
memory to userspace. The subsequent clamp check is ineffective as it
only reduces ret_data_len.
Fix this by rejecting replies shorter than
sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) with -EIO. Note that the bound is set
to the 12-byte struct size rather than the 16-byte
MIN_SNAPSHOT_ARRAY_SIZE defined in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.15.1, because 12 bytes
is exactly what copy_to_user() attempts to read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix out-of-bounds read in P2P public action frames
wilc_wfi_p2p_rx() and mgmt_tx() start parsing a frame once
ieee80211_is_public_action() returns true. That helper only verifies the
frame is long enough for the action category field, that is
offsetofend(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u.action.category), 25 bytes. Both
functions then read the P2P public action header up to oui_subtype at
offset 30 and pass "size - ie_offset" to cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(), where
ie_offset is offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u) + sizeof(*d), i.e. 32.
A public action frame of 25 to 31 bytes passes the check but is shorter
than that 32 byte header, so oui_subtype can be read out of bounds, and
because the length is unsigned, "size - ie_offset" underflows to a value
close to 4 GiB. cfg80211_find_vendor_ie() takes an unsigned int length,
so even the size_t subtraction in mgmt_tx() is truncated to the same
value. It then walks far past the buffer searching for a vendor element
until it reaches unmapped memory.
In the receive path the frame arrives over the air and needs no
association, so a nearby unauthenticated device can crash the host while
it is in P2P listen. Reject frames shorter than the P2P public action
header in both paths before dereferencing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB struct field reads in move_smb2_ea_to_cifs()
In move_smb2_ea_to_cifs(), the while (src_size > 0) loop condition is
insufficient. It allows iteration to continue even if the remaining
src_size is too small to contain a complete smb2_ea_info structure.
Consequently, reads of ea_name_length and ea_value_length can occur
out-of-bounds.
Fix this by ensuring src_size >= sizeof(*src) before attempting to read
any structure fields. Additionally, reject any next_entry_offset that is
smaller than sizeof(*src) or that would advance the pointer beyond the
available buffer.
Note that for calls where the server returns a malformed EA list, the
error returned to userspace changes from -ENODATA (getxattr) or
-ERANGE (listxattr) to -EIO. This correctly signals a server protocol
error rather than misleadingly indicating "attribute not present" or
"output buffer too small". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs
In receive_encrypted_standard(), server->total_read is left at the
full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted
frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size
to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly
validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.
This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation,
leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().
Fix this by setting server->total_read to the true length of the
current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining
pdu_length for the last one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix reparse buffer bounds in cifs_query_reparse_point()
In cifs_query_reparse_point(), the start >= end check before casting to
struct reparse_data_buffer * only ensures the start pointer is within the
response. It fails to verify that there is enough space remaining for the
fixed 8-byte header of the structure.
If a server provides a DataOffset that leaves less than 8 bytes remaining,
the check passes, but subsequent reads of ReparseTag and ReparseDataLength
will occur out-of-bounds.
Fix this by ensuring the remaining space is at least the size of the
reparse_data_buffer structure before accessing its fields. |
| NVIDIA TensorRT contains a vulnerability where an attacker can cause an out of bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtksdio, btmtkuart: validate WMT event length before struct access
btmtksdio.c and btmtkuart.c cast a received WMT event straight to
struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt and read its op/flag fields without checking
the event is long enough to contain them, unlike btmtk.c. The
FUNC_CTRL case then further casts to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc
and reads its 2-byte status field, again without a length check.
Firmware that sends a short or malformed WMT event makes both drivers
read past the end of the received SKB.
Mirror btmtk.c: validate the base WMT header with skb_pull_data()
before touching any of its fields, and when a FUNC_CTRL event turns
out to be the short, header-only form (a plain enable/disable ack
with no status word), decode the result from the header's own flag
byte instead (0 = success, otherwise failure).
Verified setup on MT7920, MT7921, MT7922 and MT7925: no regression. |
| On affected Arista access points configured with VXLAN tunnelling and L2-proxy (a specific configuration unique to the VESPA use-case), a wireless client associated to the tunnelled SSID can send a crafted packet, causing the access point to reveal memory contents in network traffic. No write primitive or remote code execution is possible. |
| A flaw was found in sssd. This vulnerability allows a local user to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by submitting a specially crafted passkey authentication token that lacks null terminators. The authentication service reads past the end of the provided memory buffer, causing the process to crash and disrupting authentication services. |
| A heap-based buffer over-read in H5Z__filter_scaleoffset() in src/H5Zscaleoffset.c in HDF5 through 2.2.0 lets an attacker cause a denial of service (application crash) with a crafted HDF5 file. When the stored minimum bits equal the full precision of the datatype, the decoder copies d_nelmts * size bytes from the compressed chunk without checking that the chunk holds that many bytes. Both values come from attacker-controlled scale-offset filter parameters in the dataset's filter pipeline message. |
| A flaw was found in SSSD. A local attacker can exploit this issue by sending a specially crafted request with an invalid packet length to the autofs responder UNIX socket. This causes an integer underflow and an out-of-bounds memory read, which can crash the responder process and result in a denial of service (DoS). |
| A flaw was found in SSSD. A local attacker with access to the Name Service Switch (NSS) responder UNIX socket can trigger an integer underflow by sending a specially crafted request with an undersized packet header. This issue causes an out-of-bounds memory read during packet parsing, crashing the responder process and resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset
with an unbounded loop:
while (offset >= walk->past + walk->frags[walk->fragi].len)
walk->past += walk->frags[walk->fragi++].len;
walk->fragi is advanced and walk->frags[walk->fragi] is dereferenced
without ever checking fragi against walk->nr_frags. When the requested
offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk's fragments,
fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack
frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory.
The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards
against this with
if (!walk->nr_frags ||
offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset)
return len;
but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the
out-of-range walk. Its own "fragi < walk->nr_frags" bound check runs only
afterwards, too late to prevent the read.
This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG)
payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() ->
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:392
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags+0x155/0x310 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:420
iptfs_reassem_cont+0xcf8/0x1140 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:902
iptfs_input_ordered+0x552/0x670 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1280
iptfs_input+0x3d6/0xde0 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1741
xfrm_input+0x282f/0x6140 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:700
xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x93/0x120 net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104
ip_rcv+0x278/0x2d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612
Give iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() the same up-front guard that
iptfs_skb_add_frags() already has, so the walk is never entered with an
out-of-range offset. When it triggers, the caller falls back to the
existing linearize-and-copy path, which is safe. |
| The H5Z__nbit_decompress_one_byte, H5Z__nbit_decompress_one_nooptype, and H5Z__nbit_decompress_one_atomic functions in H5Znbit.c in HDF5
prior to 2.3.0 advance a read index into the compressed chunk buffer without bounding it against the buffer's actual size. This allows attackers to cause an out-of-bounds heap read, and in constrained cases disclosure of adjacent heap memory into decompressed dataset values, via a crafted HDF5 file whose N-Bit filter parameters describe more decompressed data than the stored compressed chunk actually contains, triggered via H5Dread, e.g. by the h5ls or h5repack tools. |
| H5Z__filter_fletcher32 in H5Zfletcher32.c in HDF5 prior to 2.3.0 computes the data length to checksum by subtracting the 4-byte trailing checksum size from the input buffer size without checking that the buffer is at least 4 bytes, allowing a size_t underflow. This allows attackers to cause a denial of service (massively out-of-bounds read and application crash in H5_checksum_fletcher32) via a crafted HDF5 file with a Fletcher32-filtered chunk smaller than 4 bytes, triggered via H5Dread, e.g. by the h5ls or h5dump tools. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. From 9.2.0469 until 9.2.0843, popup_mark_opacity_zindex() in src/popupwin.c can use a negative w_winrow for a text-property-anchored popup with clipwindow and opacity, indexing before the screen array instead of accounting for w_popup_topoff and causing an out-of-bounds read and conditional write. This issue is fixed in version 9.2.0843. |
| tftp-hpa 5.4 before 6.0 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in rewrite_string() in tftpd/remap.c that walks heap memory during jump label searches. Unauthenticated remote attackers can send read or write requests whose filename matches a remap jump rule to crash the forked in.tftpd request handler. |
