| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and given the attacker's certificate as its issuer. Because a certificate's User IDs are self-asserted, a verifier that pins on the subkey's fingerprint or key ID while taking the identity from the enclosing certificate reports a real signature under an attacker-chosen identity. This is misattribution of a genuine signature rather than forgery of a new one: no private key is recovered, and the signature must be one the grafted subkey actually made. The low-level PGPSignature / PGPPublicKeyRing API performs no binding checks by design and is unaffected. Key Flags are a statement about the key the carrying signature refers to (RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29), so a subkey no longer inherits them from the certificate-wide signatures of the primary key: a Subkey Binding signature that omits the subpacket now leaves the subkey with no capabilities rather than the primary's, which makes the flags the cross-certification check consults the same flags every other decision consults. Preferences and the other subpackets a direct-key signature carries are inherited as before, and the primary key itself, whose flags legitimately come from its own direct-key or User ID self-signature, is unaffected. |
| Zebra (zebrad) 4.5.0 before 6.3.0 discards which peer supplied the block hashes in FindBlocks responses, then assigns 100 misbehavior points, the ban threshold, to whichever peer serves a requested block more than 50,000 heights above the tip. A remote peer can return real far-ahead hashes to a syncing node so that honest peers get banned, eroding its peer set and raising eclipse risk. |
| A flaw was found in operator-sdk-builder. The containers-policy.json configuration file defaults to insecureAcceptAnything for container image registries that are not explicitly listed. This default setting causes signature verification to be entirely skipped for images pulled from these unlisted registries, which could allow for the use of untrusted or malicious container images. |
| The block sync download path in Zebra (zebrad) before 6.3.0 reads a block's height from its unvalidated coinbase scriptSig and drops blocks that appear too far behind the tip before consensus validation, without penalizing the supplying peer. Because V5 transaction IDs exclude the scriptSig, a malicious peer can repeatedly serve a canonical block whose coinbase claims height 1 while keeping the requested hash, delaying the node's discovery of the newest block. |
| JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From JupyterLab 4.5.0 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, from Notebook 7.5.0 until 7.6.3, and from JupyterLite Core 0.7.0 until 0.8.4, the system clipboard cell-paste path accepts attacker-controlled cell JSON without clearing metadata.trusted. When useSystemClipboardForCells is active and pasteCodeCellsWithoutOutput is disabled, a pasted code cell can mark HTML output as trusted, bypass output sanitization, and execute script in the authenticated JupyterLab origin without executing the cell. Markdown and raw cells are not affected because their output is sanitized. This issue is fixed in JupyterLab 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, Notebook 7.6.3, and JupyterLite Core 0.8.4. |
| A weakness has been identified in Trusted Domain Project OpenDMARC up to 1.4.2. This affects the function opendmarc_get_tld of the file libopendmarc/opendmarc_tld.c : of the component PSL Wildcard Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to origin validation error. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A flaw was found in Samba’s certificate auto-enrollment Group Policy handling. When certificate auto-enrollment is enabled, Samba may retrieve a CA certificate over an unencrypted HTTP connection and install it into the local trust store without proper verification. An attacker with the ability to intercept or redirect network traffic could exploit this behavior to supply a malicious certificate authority certificate, potentially allowing interception or spoofing of trusted communications. |
| UltrafastSecp256k1 is a high-performance, multi-backend secp256k1 engine with reproducible audit evidence, compatibility shims, and profile-based review scopes. Prior to version 4.2.0, UltrafastSecp256k1's ECDSA adaptor pre-signature verification accepts forged adaptor pre-signatures whose "r" value is not cryptographically bound to the adaptor point "T". This issue has been patched in version 4.2.0. |
| IGEL OS 12 before 12.7.6 and IGEL OS 11 before 11.11.150 contain a boot registry parameter injection vulnerability that allows attackers with physical access to execute arbitrary Linux loader parameters by writing to an unencrypted and unsigned configuration area read by the signed bootloader. Attackers can inject malicious kernel command line parameters that execute with boot environment privileges without triggering TPM PCR measurement failures, as the attack does not modify the measured boot code. |
| openssl_encrypt before 1.4.9 fails to prevent namespace collisions between own identities and contacts in IdentityStore, allowing attackers to create shadowed contact entries invisible until the corresponding own identity is deleted. When the own identity is deleted, the shadowed contact becomes visible and resolves to the attacker's keys, enabling silent key substitution for encrypted files. |
| openssl_encrypt before 1.4.9 fails to re-derive and validate fingerprints when loading identities from identity.json, allowing attackers to substitute public keys in identity stores. Attackers can replace legitimate public keys with their own while maintaining the claimed fingerprint, enabling silent key substitution where encryption uses attacker keys and signature verification appears valid. |
| openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.0 contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in CamelliaCipher that disables HMAC tag generation and verification when the PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST environment variable is set. Attackers with code execution can set this environment variable to produce unauthenticated ciphertext and bypass integrity protection on encrypted data. |
| openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.0 contain an insecure default configuration that trusts the entire RFC 1918 private address space in IntegrityProxyConfig trusted_proxies. Attackers on private networks can forge client certificate headers to bypass mTLS authentication when ProxyAuth validation is relaxed or modified. |
| openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.0 silently skip JSON schema validation when the jsonschema library is not installed, allowing malformed metadata to be accepted. Attackers can remove the jsonschema package or supply unknown metadata format versions to bypass all schema checks and process malicious data. |
| An authenticated administrator could initiate an administrative import using a file whose contents were not fully verified, because the import validated only the file's header rather than the complete file. This could allow unverified or forged content to be accepted and processed, affecting the integrity of the imported data. |
| Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via `_txm_module_manager_memory_load` / `_txm_module_manager_in_place_load` — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in `TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE` is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB **read** (`code_size` trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as `code_start + preamble_offset` with only a `!= 0` check, and the preamble `checksum` never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded). |
| An Editor can set file-provisioning metadata (the grafana.app/managedBy, grafana.app/managerId and grafana.app/sourcePath annotations) when creating a dashboard through the dashboard API, because these fields were stored without an authorization check. The dashboard then appears file-provisioned, and administrators can no longer update or delete it through Grafana. The impact is limited to the same organization and no data is exposed. |
| FriendsOfFlarum OAuth allows users to log in to Flarum with GitHub, Twitter, Facebook, and other providers. Prior to 1.7.4 and 2.0.0-beta.4, the Discord OAuth provider does not check the verified field returned for an OAuth email before passing the address to Flarum core as trusted through provideTrustedEmail(). When Discord sign-in is enabled, an unauthenticated attacker who knows the email address of a Flarum user can configure a Discord account with that unverified address and a verified phone number, then sign in to cause Flarum to match the trusted address, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to the existing user, and authenticate as the victim without a password or victim interaction. Exploitation requires that the victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account, and it can compromise administrator accounts. Other bundled providers were not confirmed to be practically exploitable by this method because their relevant authentication flows return only verified or confirmed email addresses. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.4 and 2.0.0-beta.4. |
| A flaw was found in multicluster-global-hub. The manager component improperly validates the source identity of incoming CloudEvents on Kafka status topics. A remote attacker, after compromising a managed hub and obtaining its Kafka client certificate, can manipulate the self-asserted source identity. This allows the attacker to falsify or delete critical data, such as compliance, inventory, and cluster health information, belonging to other hubs in the database. |
| On affected platforms running Arista EOS with MLAG Dual Primary Detection configured, an unauthenticated attacker with access to the Dual Primary Detection network segment can send specially crafted packets to interfere with the dual-primary state. If the MLAG primary switch fails while these packets are present, the secondary switch incorrectly concludes it is in a dual-primary condition and err-disables its interfaces, leading to a traffic interruption. |
