| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Gitea API routes for issue attachments (`/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/assets/{attachment_id}`) also accepted attachments that belong to comments on the issue. Because the author of an issue may edit and delete the issue's attachments, a user who opened an issue could rename or delete attachments that other users had posted in comments on that issue. The contents of the attachments could not be changed. |
| When Gitea's built-in SSH server is enabled (`START_SSH_SERVER = true`), the presented public key was looked up with an SQL `LIKE` comparison of its encoded content, which is case-insensitive on some databases, including the default SQLite. An attacker who can construct a case variant of another user's registered RSA public key for which they can derive the private key could have that key matched to the victim's account and authenticate over SSH as that user. Keys are now looked up by fingerprint. |
| The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions. |
| When a Gitea Actions run was inserted, older runs in the same workflow-level concurrency group were cancelled without checking whether the new run still needed approval. Because fork pull request runs are inserted under the base repository, a user who can open a pull request from a fork could cancel trusted in-progress runs that share a concurrency group with `cancel-in-progress` enabled, without approval and without running any code. On self-hosted runners this can interrupt deployments and leave partial state behind. |
| When `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` was configured, a hostname matching the allow list was accepted without checking its resolved address against the local-network restrictions. A user who can start repository migrations and control the DNS of an allowed hostname could make it resolve to loopback or private addresses and bypass `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`, reaching internal services from the Gitea server. Instances without `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configured are not affected by this specific bypass. |
| When a private repository is transferred to a user who lacks access, Gitea grants that recipient temporary read access as a collaborator so they can review the repository. Rejecting or cancelling the transfer did not revoke this collaboration, so the named recipient kept persistent read access to the private repository, including its code, issues, pull requests and wiki, and could clone it. The repository owner was not notified. Transfer-granted access is now removed while collaborations that existed before the transfer are preserved. |
| When Gitea's web installer is reachable against a database that already contains users, such as after `INSTALL_LOCK` has been reset to `false`, submitting the install form with an administrator username matching an existing account issued an authenticated session for that account without verifying its password. If the account is an administrator, the session grants full administrative access, including changing the account's password. Databases with a single user also did not require the reinstall confirmation. |
| When a push was authenticated with a deploy key, Gitea recorded the repository owner as the pusher, so permission checks in the push hook pipeline evaluated the owner instead of the deploy key. A holder of a writable deploy key could create protected tags without being on the tag allow list and change repository visibility through push options, for example making a private repository public. Pull requests created through the AGit flow with a deploy key were also attributed to the owner. |
| With `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` set to a matching entry such as `*` or a hostname wildcard, Gitea's migration URL validation could permit reserved and link-local addresses, such as `169.254.169.254`, even when `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`. The local-network block list did not cover these ranges, and a hostname matching the allow list was accepted regardless of its resolved address. A user who can start migrations on such an instance could reach these addresses from the Gitea server; the default empty `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configuration is not affected. |
| With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected. |
| Gitea before 1.27.1 allows remote code execution via the diffpatch API through Git hook installation. |
| OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) |
| Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API |
| Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session |
| Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access |
| Branch Protection Bypass via PR Retargeting Preserves Stale `official` Approval Flag |
| Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content (incomplete revocation cleanup in `DeleteCollaboration`) |
| Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content |
| Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options |
| SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata |
