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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90087 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: do not leak an hci_conn when a second LE connect is rejected create_le_conn_complete() decides whether the failed connection is still pending by comparing it against hci_lookup_le_connect(), which returns the first LE connection in BT_CONNECT. That is the same connection only while at most one is pending. Two can be pending. Connections created on the passive scan path sit in BT_CONNECT with HCI_CONN_SCANNING set and are invisible to hci_lookup_le_connect() until hci_le_create_conn_sync() clears the flag when their command is issued, so the -EBUSY guard in hci_connect_le() does not prevent a second connection from being queued while the first is still on the scan path. Whenever two connections are in BT_CONNECT at once, the lookup may return one connection while create_le_conn_complete() is reporting the failure of the other; the early exit then drops the error and hci_conn_failed() never runs on the connection that failed. The controller also rejects a second HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN issued while another connection creation is still outstanding, per Core Spec Vol 4, Part E. The spec calls for Command Disallowed there; the bcm43438 observed here answers with an LMP/LL error code instead, which bt_to_errno() maps to the -EPROTO (-71) in the log below. The leaked connection stays in BT_CONNECT forever, and because hci_connect_le() refuses to dial while hci_lookup_le_connect() finds anything, every subsequent attempt to reach any peer fails with -EBUSY and no command reaches the controller at all. Seen on a bcm43438 with two BLE peers polled on the same interval (state 5 is BT_CONNECT; both handles are UNSET ones, allocated from the ida above HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX): Bluetooth: hci1: Opcode 0x2013 failed: -71 # hcitool con < LE 14:9C:EF:03:68:81 handle 3840 state 5 lm CENTRAL < LE C4:D3:6A:8C:B5:38 handle 3841 state 5 lm CENTRAL A btmon capture across the next ten minutes of connect attempts contains no HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN at all; outgoing LE connections do not recover until the adapter is reset. With this change the same scenario fails the rejected connection cleanly and further connects to both peers go through. Ask about the connection itself instead of about the device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90082 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: Cap MSI-X vectors to the device MSI-X table size mana_gd_query_max_resources() sizes gc->num_msix_usable from resp.max_msix and the CPU count, but never from the device MSI-X table. On a 1792 vCPU M-series VM that yields 1793 while the table has 1024 entries, and mana_gd_setup_remaining_irqs() then walks indices 1..1792, running off the end of the region mapped by msix_map_region(): BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff8e347f8b99800c RIP: 0010:msix_prepare_msi_desc+0x7a/0x90 RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ff4330cb164ea780 RCX: ff8e347f8b998000 Call Trace: <TASK> __msi_domain_alloc_irqs+0x13a/0x440 msi_domain_alloc_irq_at+0x149/0x1b0 mana_gd_setup+0x351/0x890 mana_gd_probe+0x274/0x390 </TASK> RAX is index 1024 * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE, one entry past the table. msi_insert_desc() does range check the index, but only against the MSI domain hwsize, which matches the table only for devices on an MSI parent domain. With a global PCI/MSI domain hwsize is MSI_XA_DOMAIN_SIZE, so nothing bounds the request. Cap num_msix_usable with pci_msix_vec_count(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-90079 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-af: fix cn20k mailbox lifetime on repeated rvu_mbox_init() rvu_mbox_init() is called separately for AF-PF mailboxes during probe and for AF-VF mailboxes when SR-IOV is enabled. Each call used to allocate a new ng_rvu object, leaking the first allocation when the pointer was overwritten on the second call. Sharing one ng_rvu across both paths exposed several teardown bugs: the error path freed all cn20k mailbox DMA and kfree()d ng_rvu even when only the failing init type should be unwound, leaving live AF-PF mailbox memory in use after an AF-VF init failure. mutex_init() was also re-run on the AF-VF path while AF-PF mailbox handlers could still hold rvu->mbox_lock. Probe and SR-IOV failure paths did not release cn20k mailbox DMA either, since cleanup only happened in rvu_remove(). Allocate ng_rvu once with devm_kzalloc(), initialize mbox_lock in the same block, unwind only the mailbox memory for the failing init type, and free cn20k mailbox DMA from the probe and pci_enable_sriov() error paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90061 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: skip double clone set expressions on element insert Both the dynset and newsetelem path clone the existing set expressions when setting set element expressions if no override expressions are provided. This results in a double clone, once to clone the template set expressions then another clone on the new element. Add a flag to annotate if userspace provides a override expression (ie. expression of the same type of the set but different configuration), otherwise borrow the existing expression from the set. Add conditionals to release expression iif they represent an override. Use this new override_exprs flag to dump the dynset expression override to userspace. This simplifies the existing logic and it also fixes a bug with the connlimit expression which results in a module refcount imbalance WARNING splat when resorting on the default set expressions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90040 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE'd. Use the same core logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page into the vCPU's control structure: 1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter 2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case) 3. Acquire mmu_lock for read 4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change. Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM's retry logic is fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives. If the guest_memfd page has been dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN. If the retry was due to a false positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events (and will retry in the "outer" loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as needed). Note #2! Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated on memslot bindings (KVM doesn't know what GFN range(s) to invalidate without a binding). And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a memslot, i.e. must be invalidated if its memslots disappears, regardless of the state of the underlying guest_memfd inode. Failure to invalidate the vCPU's control.vmsa_pa (which is checked by pre_sev_run()) can prevent KVM from properly freeing the page as firmware will reject the RMPUPDATE to reclaim the page with FAIL_INUSE if the vCPU is actively running, i.e. if VMSA page is in-use. That in turn leads to an RMP #PF on the next use, as the page will still be assigned to the SNP VM. SEV-SNP: RMPUPDATE failed for PFN 78d198, pg_level: 1, ret: 3 SEV-SNP: PFN 0x78d198, RMP entry: [0xfff0000000144001 - 0x000000000000000f] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70 rmpupdate+0x12c/0x140 rmp_make_shared+0x3b/0x60 sev_gmem_invalidate+0xe0/0x170 [kvm_amd] delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0 kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm] vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0 __x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x496c7e </TASK> ------------[ cut here ]------------ SEV: Failed to update RMP entry for PFN 0x78d198 error -14 WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:5160 at sev_gmem_invalidate+0x126/0x170 [kvm_amd], CPU#3: sev_snp_vmsa_pu/31345 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026 RIP: 0010:sev_gmem_invalidate+0x12b/0x170 [kvm_amd] Call Trace: <TASK> delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0 kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm] vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0 __x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x496c7e </TASK> irq event stamp: 20689 hardirqs last enabled at (20699): [<ffffffff8e76092c>] __console_unlock+0x5c/0x60 hardirqs last disabled at (20708): [<ffffffff8e760911>] __console_unlock+0x41/0x60 softirqs last enabled at (20722): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140 softirqs last disabled at (20717): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff99 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-89912 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Don't dereference a NULL collection on ITT save MAPC with V=0 drops ite->collection but leaves the ITE on the device's ITT list, and vgic_its_save_ite() dereferences it unconditionally. A guest that issues MAPD, MAPTI and then MAPC(V=0) therefore oopses the host when the VMM issues KVM_DEV_ARM_ITS_SAVE_TABLES to migrate it. That sequence is UNPREDICTABLE per the architecture, but KVM already handles the resulting state in the translate, MOVI and DISCARD paths. Save a zeroed entry, which vgic_its_restore_ite() reads back as invalid. Skipping the ITE instead would leave the ITT slot holding whatever is in guest memory, and restore rejects an entry naming a collection the restored collection table does not have. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89907 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: KVM: Validate MSI data before routing it to EIOINTC pch_msi_set_irq() passes e->msi.data straight into eiointc_set_irq() as the irq number. The MSI data comes from userspace, that either via a KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI entry set with KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING (used by irqfd and KVM_IRQ_LINE) or directly via KVM_SIGNAL_MSI, and is never checked against EIOINTC_IRQS. eiointc_set_irq() uses the value with __set_bit()/__clear_bit() on the 256-bit isr bitmap, eiointc_update_irq() then indexes sw_coremap[] and the per-cpu coreisr/sw_coreisr bitmaps with it. Therefore a data value >= 256 reads and writes memory past the end of those arrays, i.e. any process holding a VM fd can corrupt kernel memory beyond the allocation of loongarch_eiointc. Reject MSI data that doesn't fit in the EIOINTC irq space. The DMSINTC path is unaffected as it decodes the vector from the address and masks it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89866 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: chips-media: wave5: Resume device before setting EOS flag Setting the EOS flag talks to the firmware via send_firmware_command(), which accesses VPU registers. Both the STREAMOFF path (wave5_vpu_dec_job_abort()) and the V4L2_DEC_CMD_STOP path (wave5_vpu_dec_stop()) can run while the device is runtime suspended, so those register accesses hit powered-down hardware and the SoC raises an asynchronous SError, panicking the kernel: SError Interrupt on CPU3, code 0x00000000bf000000 -- SError send_firmware_command+0x2c/0x160 [wave5] wave5_vpu_dec_set_bitstream_flag+0x6c/0x80 [wave5] wave5_vpu_dec_update_bitstream_buffer+0x80/0xec [wave5] wave5_vpu_dec_job_abort+0x44/0xa0 [wave5] v4l2_m2m_cancel_job+0x110/0x19c [v4l2_mem2mem] v4l2_m2m_streamoff+0x24/0x140 [v4l2_mem2mem] Resume the device with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() around the EOS firmware command and release it with pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(), matching the runtime PM handling already done in wave5_vpu_dec_device_run(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89813 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: force complete the KIQ ring fences on reset Like the MES scheduler ring, the KIQ ring sets no_scheduler = true and uses a polling fence, so it is skipped by the force-completion loop in amdgpu_device_pre_asic_reset(). Its hw fence value lives in wb (GTT) memory and survives a MODE1 reset while fence_drv.sync_seq keeps advancing, so after a reset the first KIQ submission can poll forever on a seq that is never written back. Force complete the KIQ ring fences too so their hw fence is realigned to sync_seq. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89812 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: force complete the MES ring fences on reset The MES scheduler ring has no drm scheduler (no_scheduler = true), so it is skipped by the force-completion loop in amdgpu_device_pre_asic_reset(). It uses a polling fence whose hw value lives in wb (GTT) memory and survives a MODE1 reset, while fence_drv.sync_seq keeps advancing for every packet. When the reset is triggered because MES itself stopped responding, the timed-out packets advance sync_seq past the last hw fence value MES wrote. After resume the first MES submission polls forever on a seq that is never written back, failing the resume and wedging the box on a second reset: amdgpu: MES ring buffer is full. amdgpu: *ERROR* ring gfx_0.0.0 test failed (-110) amdgpu: resume of IP block <gfx_v11_0> failed -110 amdgpu: GPU reset end with ret = -110 Force complete the MES scheduler ring fences together with the scheduler rings so their hw fence is realigned to sync_seq. v2: cover all XCCs (one scheduler ring each), not just mes.ring[0]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89718 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: fix out-of-bounds access in writeback_store() Patch series "zram: fix stale scan bounds after reinitialization". Both writeback_store() and read_block_state() derive their table scan bounds from zram->disksize before acquiring dev_lock. If the device is reset and reinitialized with a smaller disksize between that read and lock acquisition, the bound can describe the old table while the scan operates on the new one. This can lead to out-of-bounds slot accesses. Move both bound calculations under dev_lock so each bound remains consistent with the table throughout its scan. Keep the fixes separate because the affected interfaces originate from different commits and can be backported independently. This patch (of 2): writeback_store() calculates the table scan bounds before taking dev_lock. A reset followed by reconfiguration with a smaller disksize can therefore replace zram->table while writeback_store() is waiting for the lock. Once it acquires the lock, it sees an initialized device but scans the new table using the old upper bound, resulting in an out-of-bounds access. Calculate the number of pages while holding dev_lock so the scan bound matches the table protected by the lock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89709 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lockd, nfsd: RCU-protect nlmsvc_ops dispatch nlmsvc_ops is published by nfsd_lockd_init() and cleared by nfsd_lockd_shutdown() with plain stores, while lockd dereferences it unguarded from dispatch sites in fs/lockd/svcsubs.c. The pointer targets nfsd's .rodata and the fopen/fclose callbacks live in nfsd's .text, so a stale load after rmmod nfsd results in either a NULL deref or a module-text use-after-free. Declare nlmsvc_ops as __rcu, publish via rcu_assign_pointer(), clear via RCU_INIT_POINTER() + synchronize_rcu(). Add a struct module *owner field to nlmsvc_binding and pin the module across indirect calls with try_module_get/module_put. When the binding is torn down, fall back to fput() to avoid leaking struct file references. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89705 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: restore rq_status_counter to even on all nfsd_dispatch() exit paths nfsd_dispatch() sets rq_status_counter to an odd value once a request has been decoded, and back to an even value once it has been fully processed, forming a seq-lock like protocol with the lockless reader in nfsd_nl_rpc_status_get_dumpit(). Only the fully successful path restored the counter to even. The cache-hit (RC_REPLY), drop (RC_DROPIT / RQ_DROPME) and encode-error paths all return after the odd-valued store without ever bringing the counter back to even. Once one of those paths is taken, rq_status_counter is left odd: the next request's decode ORs in 1 (still odd) and only a subsequent successful encode restores even. While stuck odd, the dumpit reader treats the rqstp fields as stable and its retry check compares against the same unchanging odd value, so it never detects concurrent mutation. This exposes actively mutating fields (e.g. args->ops / args->opcnt during compound decode and release) to the lockless reader, which can read past the end of the 8-element inline ops array. Add a helper that advances the counter to the next even value and call it on every return path that follows the odd-valued store. The decode-error path is left untouched as it is reached before the counter is set odd. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89642 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cifs: call pagecache_isize_extended() in cifs_setsize() when extending cifs_setsize() calls truncate_pagecache() but skips pagecache_isize_extended() on extension. truncate_setsize() shows the correct pattern: i_size_write(inode, newsize); if (newsize > oldsize) pagecache_isize_extended(inode, oldsize, newsize); truncate_pagecache(inode, newsize); pagecache_isize_extended() zeroes the tail of the page straddling old EOF. Without it, dirty bytes in that region can be written back to the server, exposing stale data in the newly extended range. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89633 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2() coalesce_t2() computes data pointers directly from server-supplied DataOffset fields with no validation against buffer bounds: data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; ... memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); A small DataOffset can push a pointer below the actual byte area, overwriting header fields; a large one can push it past the buffer end, causing out-of-bounds heap reads (source) or writes (target). The BCC overflow guard does not prevent this: BCC reflects how much data is present, while DataOffset controls where in the buffer it starts. The "validate target area" comment present since the function was first written in 2005 was a placeholder that was never implemented. Add lower- and upper-bound checks for both data pointers before the memcpy, and before any target header fields are modified. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89601 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext2: Fix lost inode updates for IS_SYNC inodes ext2_setsize() and ext2_xattr_set2() had a construct like: if (IS_SYNC(inode)) { sync_inode_metadata(inode, 1); } else { mark_inode_dirty(inode); } which leads to lost inode updates for IS_SYNC inodes because sync_inode_metadata() does anything only if the inode is already dirty and hence inode updates may be simply lost. Fix the problem by unconditionally marking the inode dirty and *then* call sync_inode_metadata(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89568 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kho: fix size calculation in kho_preserved_memory_reserve() kho_preserved_memory_reserve() calculates the size of a preservation by doing 1 << (order + PAGE_SHIFT). Since the '1' is a 32-bit integer, it can only be shifted by 31. That is, it will only work for preservations up to 2 GiB. Larger preservations will trigger undefined behaviour. While preservations larger than 2 GiB can't be obtained via folios currently, they can be obtained via kho_preserve_pages(). For example, memblock reserve_mem uses kho_preserve_pages(). Reservations larger than 2 GiB are valid and will trigger this bug if properly aligned. Fix it by using 1UL for shifting. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89534 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Clear sc_cm_id when ADDR_CHANGE replacement fails When svc_rdma_listen_handler() handles RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_CHANGE, it creates a replacement listener cm_id and returns 1, telling the CM core to destroy the old one. If the replacement allocation fails, sc_cm_id still points at the old cm_id that the CM core is about to destroy. Any subsequent dereference of sc_cm_id -- such as svc_rdma_detach()'s rdma_disconnect() call -- is a use-after-free. NULL sc_cm_id on the failure path and guard svc_rdma_detach()'s rdma_disconnect() call against NULL so that the listener can be torn down safely when the server shuts down. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89527 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Use svc_xprt_put to free listener on create failure svc_rdma_create() calls kfree(cma_xprt) when svc_rdma_create_listen_id() fails. svc_xprt_init() has already acquired a net namespace reference via get_net_track(); kfree bypasses svc_xprt_free() which releases it. Replace the kfree() with svc_xprt_put() so the kref_init birth reference drops to zero and svc_xprt_free() dispatches svc_rdma_free() to clean up properly. sc_cm_id is still NULL at that point; the preceding patch added the necessary NULL guard in svc_rdma_free(). svc_xprt_free() also drops the module reference via module_put(), but the caller _svc_xprt_create() does the same on xpo_create failure, double-putting the single try_module_get() it acquired. Take a compensating __module_get() before the svc_xprt_put() to keep the count balanced, matching the convention in svc_rdma_accept()'s error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89513 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RISC-V: KVM: Fix PMU event info array size overflow SBI PMU EVENT_GET_INFO stores guest-controlled num_events * sizeof(*einfo) in a 32-bit integer. On RV64, num_events = 0x10000001 makes 0x100000010 truncate to 16. KVM then allocates one entry but loops over the original num_events, causing out-of-bounds reads and writes. A nested guest triggered: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0xa4/0x142 Read of size 4 at addr ff600000074d46b0 by task init/1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8006471c>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0xa4/0x142 [<ffffffff800690c0>] kvm_sbi_ext_pmu_handler+0xca/0x268 [<ffffffff8006779e>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_ecall+0xec/0x1e6 [<ffffffff8006008c>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_exit+0x48c/0x540 [<ffffffff8005ea0a>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x37e/0xc80 Allocated by task 1: __kmalloc_noprof+0x19e/0x4b0 kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0x72/0x142 kvm_sbi_ext_pmu_handler+0xca/0x268 kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_ecall+0xec/0x1e6 kvm_riscv_vcpu_exit+0x48c/0x540 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x37e/0xc80 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 16-byte region [ff600000074d46a0, ff600000074d46b0) Store the shared-memory size in size_t and reject multiplication overflow. Allocate the guest-driven array with GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT so it is charged to kmemcg, and use __GFP_NOWARN to suppress allocation failure warnings. Use kvcalloc() to allow vmalloc fallback and an unsigned long loop index to match num_events. | ||||