| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio: fix use-after-free in unregister_virtio_device()
device_unregister() is device_del() plus put_device(). When the caller
holds no extra reference, that drops the last one and runs the release
callback, which for several transports frees the memory the embedded
struct virtio_device sits in. unregister_virtio_device() then calls
virtio_debug_device_exit(), which reads dev->debugfs_dir out of the freed
object.
Affected transports are the ones whose release callback frees and whose
remove path takes no reference: virtio_mmio, virtio_vdpa, virtio_uml,
mlxbf-tmfifo and virtio_ccw. virtio_pci is unaffected because
virtio_pci_remove() brackets the call with get_device() and put_device().
Remove the debugfs entries before the device can go away. They are only
accessed through the protected debugfs interface, so
debugfs_remove_recursive() waits for in-progress file operations before
returning. Tearing them down while the device is still alive is therefore
safe.
Reproduced on User-Mode Linux with CONFIG_KASAN and CONFIG_VIRTIO_DEBUG
by unbinding a virtio-uml device:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in virtio_debug_device_exit+0x36/0x4d
Read of size 8 at addr 00000000616e0b10 by task init/1
__asan_report_load8_noabort
virtio_debug_device_exit+0x36/0x4d
unregister_virtio_device+0x48/0x75
virtio_uml_remove
platform_remove
device_release_driver_internal
unbind_store
Freed by task 1:
kfree
virtio_uml_release_dev
device_release
kobject_put
put_device
device_unregister
With this applied, the report is gone and unbind is clean. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark faultable stack helpers as sleepable
The faultable variants of bpf_get_stack() and bpf_get_task_stack() pass
may_fault=true into the common stack collection code. Resolving user-space
build IDs may then call build_id_parse_file() and block on filesystem
reads.
Neither helper prototype sets might_sleep. Since prototype selection uses
the sleepability of the whole program, the verifier can still allow these
helpers from a non-sleepable region within that program, such as an
explicit RCU or preemption-disabled region. The task-stack helper can also
be called from a non-sleepable timer callback of a sleepable program.
Mark both faultable prototypes as sleepable. The existing helper context
check then rejects these calls while continuing to allow them in genuinely
sleepable contexts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: Fix potential UAF in pec_store
Sashiko reports:
In pec_store(), a guard(mutex)(&hwdev->lock) is taken. If the chip write
operation returns an error other than -EOPNOTSUPP, the code jumps to the
put label, which calls put_device(hdev). If this drops the final reference,
the device is freed. When the function then returns, the guard cleanup
function runs and attempts to unlock the freed mutex.
Use scoped_guard() instead of guard() to avoid the problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Fix ineffective error check in nested domain allocation
amd_iommu_pdom_id_alloc() returns an int: a domain ID on success, or the
negative errno from ida_alloc_range() when the ID space is exhausted or
memory is short. amd_iommu_alloc_domain_nested() stores that return value
in gdom_info->hdom_id, which is a u32, and only then tests it:
gdom_info->hdom_id = amd_iommu_pdom_id_alloc();
if (gdom_info->hdom_id <= 0) {
The assignment discards the sign, so -ENOSPC becomes 0xffffffe4 and the
test never fires. The nested domain is then set up with a host domain ID
that was never allocated, instead of the allocation failing with -ENOSPC.
Keep the value in an int, test it there, and store it only once it is
known to be valid, which is what the other amd_iommu_pdom_id_alloc()
callers already do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Do not reallocate GA log buffers on resume
Commit c5e1a1eb9279 ("iommu/amd: Simplify and Consolidate Virtual APIC
(AVIC) Enablement") moved the GA log allocation from iommu_init_pci()
to enable_iommus_vapic(), which is called on every resume.
iommu_init_ga_log() assigns iommu->ga_log and iommu->ga_log_tail
unconditionally. Each resume therefore replaces the boot-time pointers
and leaks both old allocations. The function also uses GFP_KERNEL from a
syscore resume callback, where interrupts are disabled and the non-boot
CPUs are offline.
Return early if both buffers are already allocated. Clear the pointers
in free_ga_log() so a partial allocation failure cannot leave ga_log
dangling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: delimit inode_share cache key components
Previously, inode_share keys were encoded as follows:
fingerprint || domain_id
It would be better to have a separator between the fingerprint and domain
ID so that the fingerprint won't be parsed as part of a domain ID.
Change the key encoding as follows:
domain_id || '\0' || fingerprint
Since domain_id is a NUL-terminated string, this makes the in-memory key
indices unambiguous. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mctp: i3c: serialize probe with bus removal
mctp_i3c_probe() drops busdevs_lock after finding the matching bus. A
concurrent I3C_NOTIFY_BUS_REMOVE can then unregister and free the bus
netdev before probe passes its private data to mctp_i3c_add_device().
The latter consequently adds a list node through a freed mbus pointer.
Keep busdevs_lock held until the device has been added. This also
satisfies the __must_hold annotation on mctp_i3c_add_device(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (ltc4282) Make sure clk_init_data is fully initialized
The clk_init_data structure contains several mutually-exclusive members
for different methods to specify the possible parents of a clock,
prompting drivers to initialize only the members they need. However,
not initializing all members may cause subtle issues, which are only
exposed when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN or CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE is
enabled.
ltc428_clk_provider_setup() does not fill in any parent clocks, and
assumes that init.num_parents is NULL. However, the latter in
uninitialized, and thus may cause a crash.
Make sure all members are fully initialized, to fix such bugs, and to
avoid future breakage when converting drivers to a different method for
specifying the parents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Cancel special fields when recycling rhtab elements
rhtab_map_update_existing() and rhtab_delete_elem() call
bpf_obj_free_fields() when replacing or deleting a value. These map
operations can run from BPF programs in NMI context, where releasing a
referenced kptr or another complex field is not generally safe.
Array and hash maps avoid that problem by cancelling only the asynchronous
fields which can be stopped safely in the caller context. Other ownership
state remains attached to the allocation until its memory allocator
destructor performs the final cleanup.
Use bpf_obj_cancel_fields() for the corresponding rhtab paths as well. This
cancels timers, workqueues, and task work while allowing rhtab_mem_dtor() to
release referenced kptrs when the allocation is eventually destroyed.
[ kkd: Rebased, used direct helper calls, and rewrote the commit log ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_nat_sip: rewind offset when NAT shrinks the packet
sashiko says:
If map_addr() changes the packet length, such as when the public NAT IP
string is shorter or longer than the internal IP, coff will still point to
the offset relative to the pre-mangled packet.
If the packet shrinks, coff could overshoot the correct position,
potentially causing the next ct_sip_parse_header_uri() call to silently
skip bytes and miss subsequent Contact headers. Could this lead to a
failure to NAT those subsequent headers and leak internal network details? |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Check ancestor frames for rbtree callbacks
bpf_rbtree_add() invokes its comparator while the caller holds the root
lock. The native insertion code retains raw parent and link pointers across
the callback, so the verifier prohibits unlocking, consuming tree nodes,
or changing RCU state from that callback.
in_rbtree_lock_required_cb() only checks the innermost verifier frame.
Static subprogram calls are permitted while holding a spin lock, and such a
call pushes a frame without in_callback_fn set. Consequently, all callback
restrictions disappear in the nested frame. The subprogram can unlock the
tree, remove and drop the node being compared, then relock. Native insertion
resumes with the stale parent pointer and links freed memory into the tree.
Walk all active frames for the rbtree callback instead. Benign static
subprograms remain permitted, while callback restrictions follow execution
into nested frames. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Remove __counted_by from struct amdxdna_cmd_chain
struct amdxdna_cmd_chain contains a flexible array annotated with
__counted_by(command_count). Since the structure is stored in shared
AMDXDNA_BO_SHARE memory, userspace can modify command_count concurrently.
If command_count is changed to zero, the bounds check generated from
__counted_by may fail and trigger a kernel panic.
Remove __counted_by to avoid relying on the userspace-controlled
command_count for the flexible array bounds check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: nfp: drop the replaced rule from the list when reprogramming fails
nfp_net_fs_add() replaces an existing rule by deleting it from the
hardware, decrementing nn->fs.count and programming the new one. If
nfp_net_fs_add_hw() fails the old entry stays on nn->fs.list - only the
success path reaches list_replace() - so the list is one longer than
nn->fs.count, and it advertises a rule whose hardware entry has already
been torn down.
nn->fs.count is what ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLCNT reports, so userspace then sizes
its buffer one entry short of what the GRXCLSRLALL walk wants to write.
That used to overwrite one u32 past the allocation; since the walk is
bounded it is a permanent -EMSGSIZE instead, as nothing ever resyncs the
counter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Preserve special fields in recycled rhtab elements
rhtab_map_update_elem() initializes special fields after obtaining an
element from bpf_mem_cache_alloc(). The allocator can return a fresh,
zeroed unit, or recycle one from its RCU-pending lists before the
registered destructor has run.
A BPF program can retain a map-value pointer after deleting its element
and initialize and arm a timer through that pointer. If the deleted unit
is recycled, check_and_init_map_value() clears the only pointer to the
timer. Neither a later deletion nor rhtab_mem_dtor() can then cancel it,
and the callback can run with its key and value pointing into freed memory.
Do not reinitialize special fields on insertion. Fresh allocator units are
already zeroed. For recycled units, the special fields are ownership state
that must remain visible to the eventual destructor. copy_map_value()
already skips those fields, matching the non-preallocated hash-map path and
the lifecycle established by commit 275c30bcee66 ("bpf: Don't reinit map
value in prealloc_lru_pop").
[ kkd: Split out the fix and rewrote the commit log ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Don't predict JMP32 pointer vs zero comparisons
Consider the following program:
r1 = map_value; /* low 32 bits are zero at runtime */
r6 = 0xdead000000000000;
if w1 != 0 goto l1;
l0: r1 += r6;
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);
exit;
l1: r6 = 0;
goto l0;
At the moment is_branch_taken() reports the jump as always taken,
because it does not distinguish between BPF_JMP and BPF_JMP32
comparisons when processing 'if w1 != 0 ...'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject tail calls directly from callback frames
A tail call from a non-zero frame is modeled as a return from that frame.
The verifier makes R0 unknown and calls prepare_func_exit() for the taken
branch.
When the current frame is a synchronous callback, prepare_func_exit()
enforces the callback return-value contract and marks R0 precise. Since the
tail-call path synthesized R0 rather than deriving it from an instruction,
precision backtracking reaches the callback-calling instruction with R0
still requested and triggers the "callback unexpected regs" verifier bug.
A CAP_BPF task can therefore cause a WARN and an -EFAULT BPF_PROG_LOAD.
Tail calls reachable from callbacks are already rejected later by
check_max_stack_depth(). Reject a tail call made directly by a callback
before constructing the inconsistent return state, using the existing
diagnostic. Tail calls from ordinary subprograms keep their current
behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: propagate reparse index insertion failure
update_reparse_data() ignores the return value of
set_reparse_index(). When index insertion fails, the code removes
the just-written reparse data as cleanup but still returns 0, so
symlink(2) (and WSL special file creation) reports success while
no reparse data exists on disk. When there was no previous reparse
data (oldsize == 0), the failure was likewise silently ignored.
Propagate the error to the caller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel: ethosu: Don't read the U65 rounding mode as a storage mode
Bits 15:14 of NPU_SET_{IFM,OFM}_PRECISION select the activation storage
mode on U85 only. On U65 the same field holds the rounding mode, and the
command stream parser has read it as a storage mode since the driver was
added.
That went unnoticed while unknown values fell through the switch, but
now that they are rejected, every U65 command stream that asks for
natural rounding (2) fails CMDSTREAM_BO_CREATE with -EINVAL. Mesa emits
it for average pooling, concatenation, split, unpack, strided slice, LUT
and argmax, which is 72 failures of the Teflon test suite on an i.MX93.
Truncating rounding (1) is misread as well: it picks the two-tile
address path and computes a bogus feature map size from tile bases the
command stream never set.
Read the field as a storage mode only on the hardware where it is one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic
Take the following unprivileged program as an example:
r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...) /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */
...
14: r0 += r1 /* r1 is a bounded scalar */
15: r9 = r0
Loading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check():
verifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out
of sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0}
r32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0)
What happens:
1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new
offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges.
2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds,
__mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is
re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by
reg_bounds_sync().
3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via
sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current
register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be
verified directly as a speculative path.
4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync():
at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original
offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two
are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15
(r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and
trips the warning.
var_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two
ways to keep the snapshot consistent:
1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or
2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it
only after the snapshot.
The whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking
sequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state
it snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move
__mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative
snapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative
path is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and
re-derived by reg_bounds_sync(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: reject a command chain that carries no commands
A chain whose command_count is zero passes the payload length check,
because struct_size(payload, data, 0) is just the header. The fill loop
then does not run, so offset stays zero and the request is submitted with
a zero-length buffer.
On firmware without AIE2_NPU_COMMAND that ends at the opcode check, since
op is still ERT_INVALID_CMD and aie2_get_chain_msg_op() answers
MSG_OP_MAX_OPCODE. aie2_get_npu_chain_msg_op() answers
MSG_OP_CHAIN_EXEC_NPU whatever it is given, so there the submission
continues to drm_clflush_virt_range(cmd_buf, 0), which reads the byte
before the buffer and faults on the vmap guard page. EXEC_CMD is
reachable by any process that can open the render node.
Reject the request instead. |
